People v. Phipps

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1870 No. No. 2,275Published

Before: Crockett, Sprague

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Holding. The court held that an indictment is sufficient if it states the acts constituting the offense, even if it lacks the proper statutory appellation. Furthermore, the court held that in circumstantial cases, each essential independent fact in the chain of evidence must be established to a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court erred in refusing instructions to that effect.

Issues

Whether an indictment is invalid for failing to provide the proper statutory appellation of the crime.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that each essential independent fact in a chain of circumstantial evidence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether an instruction allowing conviction despite a lack of being 'entirely satisfied' that the defendant committed the offense is erroneous.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“each essential, independent fact in the chain or series of facts relied upon to establish the main fact, must be established to a moral certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Synopsis

Criminal Peactice.—Indictment.—Description of Offense.—Though an indictment give an erroneous appellation, or fail to give any appellation, to the offense, if the' acts constituting the offense, as defined by the statute, are sufficientiy stated, the requirements of the Criminal Code, in that respect, are answered.

Idem.—Circumstantial Evidence.—Where independent facts and circumstances are relied upon to identify the accused as the person committing the offense charged, each essential independent fact in the chain or series of facts relied upon to create a presumption of guilt must be established to a moral certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt.

Idem.—Instructions.—When the evidence against the accused is entirely circumstantial, and is conflicting in relation to a material fact going to make up the chain of circumstances, an instruction to the effect that “if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the existence of such fact, the defendant must be acquitted,” is pertinent and appropriate, and should be given.

Per Cbochett, J.:

Instruction.—Criminal Practice.—In a criminal prosecution, an instruction from the Court to the jury, that they must convict, “ although they may not be entirely satisfied, from the evidence, that the defendant, and no other or different person, committed theoffense,” is erroneous.

Evidence Necessary to Convict.—No conviction should be had unless the jury is “entirely satisfied,” from the evidence, that the defendant is guilty.

Sprague, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Temple, J., Rhodes, C. J., and Wallace, J., concurring:

The objection to the indictment, that it fails to give the proper legal appellation of the crime, is not well taken; it is but an objection to matter of form, not tending to the prejudice of defendant. The acts constituting the offense are sufficiently stated to give explicit information of the offense as defined by the statute, and the failure to insert the statutory appellation of the crime, in accordance Avith the form prescribed by Section 238 of the Criminal Practice Act, does not vitiate. (Crim. Pr. Act, Sec. 247; People v. Beatty, 14 Cal. 572.)

. Though an indictment give an erroneous appellation, or fail to give any appellation to the offense, if the. acts consti[332]tuting the offense, as defined by the statute, are sufficiently stated, the requirements of our Criminal Code, in that respect, are answered. (Crim. Prac. Act, Secs. 237, 246.)

The indictment, although liable to criticism as to form, is a sufficient valid indictment for the offense designated in our statute as arson in the first degree, and is not obnoxious to the objection that it charges two distinct offenses.

The indictment charges the defendant as a principal. The entire evidence, as given on the trial, is contained in the record, and so far as it tends to criminate defendant, is entirely circumstantial; from this evidence, it sufficiently appears that there could be no plausible theory upon which the prosecution could base a rational presumption of defendant’s guilt, except that he set fire to the premises with his own hands. The tenth instruction, therefore, asked for by the defendant, and refused by the Court, should have been given, and although from the record before us we cannot distinctly discover that defendant was prejudiced by this error, yet, from the fact that error is disclosed, we must presume that defendant’s legal rights were thereby prejudiced.

The fourteenth and fifteenth instructions asked for by defendant, were refused as asked, but the Court gave the fourteenth, except the closing clause, which was in the following words : “And, in case of reasonable doubt, the jury should acquit; ” and the fifteenth, with the exception of the closing clause, which was in the following words: “And, fairly considering the liabilities to mistake person and time, if a reasonable doubt exists, the defendant must be acquitted,” which closing clauses the Court refused to give.

People v. Phipps

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