Hirsch v. Rand

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1870 No. No. 1,974Published

Before: Temple

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Holding. The court held that a plaintiff may properly allege a trespass as a personal act of the defendant even when the act was committed by the defendant's deputy in an official capacity. Furthermore, the defendant's status as a United States Marshal does not deprive the state court of jurisdiction absent a motion to transfer the case to federal court.

Issues

Whether a complaint must explicitly state the official character of a defendant to recover for a trespass committed by the defendant's deputy.
Whether a state court lacks jurisdiction over a trespass action when the defendant is a United States Marshal acting through a deputy.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The act is that of the principal, the deputy being the mere instrument through which he acted; and the object of the suit is to establish a personal, and not an official, liability.”

“The act constituting the cause of action, is that of the defendant; and, though done through a deputy, is considered in law as done directly and personally by him, and was properly so alleged.”

“It is in the nature of a privilege which the defendant may, perhaps, avail himself of, but it does not go to the jurisdiction of the Court, when no motion is made to transfer the cause.”

Synopsis

Trespass by a Marshal..—A trespass committed by a Deputy Marshal or Sheriff, in his official character, is considered, in law, as committed directly and personally by his principal.

Idem:.—Personal Responsibility When a trespass is committed by a Marshal or Sheriff, either personally or by deputy, his official character does not relieve him from personal responsibility.

Idem.—Action eor Damages.—Pleading.—In an action against an officer, such as Sheriff or Marshal, for a trespass committed through his deputy, it is not necessary to state the official character of the defendant in the complaint, or to charge the trespass as having been committed through a deputy.

Action fob Trespass against a United States Marshal.—Jurisdiction of.— District Courts have jurisdiction of actions for trespass against a United States Marshal.

Idem.—Whether the fact that defendant was Marshal of the United States, and the trespass was committed by his deputy, under cover of his office, gives him the right to have the cause transferred to the Courts of the United States—no decided,

Temple, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an action brought to recover damages for false imprisonment. When the case was called for trial, the plaintiff made a statement of the facts upon which he relied to recover; the substance of which, so far as it affects the question involved upon this appeal, is as follows: The

defendant was United States Marshal of the District at the time of the alleged trespass. That the plaintiff was arrested by the defendant’s deputy, as a deserter from the army of the United States. That the plaintiff immediately informed the deputy who arrested him, ■ that he was a stranger in the country, and had recently arrived from Germany, and had his passport at the hotel, where there were several persons who. had known him upon the steamer during his voyage, and by whom he could easily establish his innocence, and that if the Marshal would take pains to investigate the matter, he would be easily satisfied that he was not the guilty party. That the Marshal refused to make any investigation to satisfy [317]himself of the identity of the plaintiff, but confined Dim in a dungeon, where he was kept over night, where he was subjected to some bad treatment, and was discharged at half-past nine the next morning, without any explanation whatever. That the deputy who arrested plaintiff, was appointed by defendant for the express purpose of arresting deserters from the army, and that plaintiff was innocent of the charge upon which he was arrested.

Upon this statement being made,- the defendant moved for nonsuit, upon the ground:

First—The action was not brought against the defendant for any official misconduct, nor was there any allegation of that kind in the pleadings; that the complaint was against him as an individual, and not as Marshal.

Second—That the defendant was not sued in his official character.

Third—That if it had appeared upon the face of the complaint that the defendant was sued for an act done as United States Marshal, then the Court had no jurisdiction-; and the plaintiff, by omitting such statement, could not confer jurisdiction upon this Court.

Fourth—That the facts stated by the counsel in his opening, did not constitute any ground of action against the defendant.

The Court granted the motion for a nonsuit, and the plaintiff appeals from the order and judgment entered.

Hirsch v. Rand

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