People v. Trim

Sprague, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

Appellant, William T. Trim and Mary F. Trim, as principals, were jointly indicted for the crime of arson, in the second degree, under the seventh section of the Act of April 16, 1856 (Stats. 1856, p. 132), which section reads as follows : “ Every person who shall wilfully burn, or cause to be [77]burned, any building, ship, vessel, or other water craft, or any goods, wares, merchandise, or other chattel, which shall be at the time insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injure or defraud such insurer, whether the same be the property of such person or of any other, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of arson in the second degree, and punished accordingly. ” By the record, it appears that appellant was tried separately, and convicted of the offense charged in the indictment, and now, on appeal from the judgment, insists upon a reversal thereof upon two grounds:

First—Error in the Court below in admitting evidence of the declarations of Mary F. Trim, Avho ivas jointly indicted Avitli appellant for the same offense, against his objections; and,

Second—In refusing to give certain instructions to the jury, asked for by him.

The record discloses that the declarations of Mary F. Trim, given in evidence, on the trial, against appellant’s objections, were admitted by the Court after preliminary evidence had been introduced by the prosecution tending to prove that appellant and Mary F. Trim conspired together to commit the offense charged in the indictment, sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to go to the jury. That these declarations, so admitted, in substance, were, that on the next day after the burning of the house, charged in the indictment, at the office of the insurer of the premises, Mary F. Trim stated to the Avitness, who Avas President of the insurance corporation, that she Avas burned out, and wanted to be settled with, and the succeeding day she again, at the same place, stated to the witness that she wanted to be settled Avith then and there.

The offense, as defined by the statute above referred to, and as charged in the indictment, consists of burning the building insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injure or defraud the insurer. The intent to defraud the insurer of such building is quite, as essential to constitute the offense under the statute as the intent to destroy the insured building by fire; and after evidence tending to