People v. Castro
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Tax bob School Pubposes.—A special tax for school purposes can only he levied, after the question has heen submitted to the qualified electors of the district, in the manner pointed out by the statute.
Idem.—Actions to Collect such Taxes.—Pleading.—The holding of such an election is a jurisdictional fact, and it is, therefore, necessary to aver it with precision, and in such manner as to admit of a direct issue upon the facts averred.
Idem.—Pbactice.—When the answer denies that any election to authorize the tax was ever held, and, upon the trial, there was no attempt to prove the holding of an election, a nonsuit should he granted.
Idem.—Fbaud.—If it ho shown that the land on which the tax was assessed did not belong to the defendant, hut to other persons in the actual occupation thereof, holding the title under recorded deeds, the fact establishes a legal, fraud, which vitiates the entire assessment.
Crockett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is an action commenced before a Justice of the Peace to collect a special school tax, alleged to have been levied for the purpose of creating a school house in Aptos School District, in Santa Cruz County. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and at the same time filed his answer thereto, denying that the tax was ever levied; that the property of the defendant was assessed as alleged; that any election was ever held in said district in respect to the levying of said tax; or that the defendant was the owner of the whole of the real estate alleged to have been assessed to him; and averring fraud in the pretended levy and assessment, in this, to wit: In attempting to assess him in a large sum, which he is not liable to pay, upon property which he does not own, and at a valuation exceeding, by $30,000, its true value; and averring, further, that the determination of the action necessarily involved the legality of the alleged tax and assessment, and prayed that the cause be transferred to the District Court for trial. On the filing of the answer the Justice transferred the action to the District Court for trial, and thereupon the [68]said Court overruled the demurrer to the complaint and proceeded to try the action on its merits. The plaintiff put in evidence the assessment roll, which, on its face, purported to be an assessment of all property, real and personal, situated in said school district, made in pursuance of an election by the qualified electors of the district for the collection of a tax for the erection of a district school house in said district. The assessment roll purported to be certified by TJ. S. Nichols, as District Assessor, but no proof was offered to show that he was such Assessor, nor was there any proof of the authenticity of the certificate, and the defendant objected to the admission of the assessment roll in evidence on these grounds, but the Court overruled the objection. This was the only evidence introduced by the plaintiff to sustain the action, and thereupon the defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground: First—That there was no proof to show that any election had been held in the district to authorize the tax; or, Second—To show that Nichols ever was the Assessor in said district; or, Third-—That the assessment roll had been equalized; or, Fourth—That'any of the steps required by law to precede the assessment had been taken. The Court denied the motion and the defendant excepted. The defendant then proved that, at the time of the assessment, he was not, and for a long time prior thereto, had not been the owner or in possession of about fifteen hundred acres of the land assessed to him; and that this portion of said land was in the actual occupation of other persons, to whom it belonged. The defendant then offered proof tending to show what was the actual value of all the lands owned by him in said district at the date of the assessment; but the Court excluded the proof as immaterial. He also offered to prove that no prior notice whatever was given of the pretended election, and that, on the day of election, it was held only between the hours of two o’clock and five o’clock P. M.; but the Court excluded this proof, also, as immaterial, and thereupon entered judgment for the plaintiff for the whole amount claimed.
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