Prince v. Lynch
Before: Also, Cboceett, Rhodes, Sawyer
Synopsis
Pbactice.—After trial by the Court, when it has filed its findings and rendered judgment, it is irregular for it, upon motion of one of the parties, to re-examine the evidence and reverse its former action, or substitute different findings of facts.
Idem..—The only regular way for the Court to review its former action is on a motion for a new trial.
Release of a Stockholdeb in a Cobpobation.—Where a creditor of a corporation, by an instrument under seal, releases a stockholder from all personal liability for his debt, he thereby discharges the corporation, and other stockholders to the same extent as the one to whom the release-is executed.
Idem.—If the release be for the releasee’s proportion of the indebtedness of the corporation, the company and the other stockholders are only released pro tanto. Payment by a ITehbeb of a Cobpobation.—Such release will he sufficient to support the plea of payment made by a stockholder in an action against him for his proportion of the debts of the corporation, under the sixteenth section of the Act concerning corporations, as amended by Act of 18.63. (Statutes of Cal. for 1863, p. 736.)
Per Obockett, J., dissenting:
Pbactice. —If the Court, through inadvertence, or a mis conception of the testimony, finds contrary to the evidence, I can perceive no valid reason why it may not, at any time during the term and before entry of the judgment, receive tho suggestions of counsel as to the alleged errors, and correct them on its own motion.
Pbopeety Pbimabily Liable fob the Dbbts of A Cobpobation.—As between the corporation and its stockholders, the corporate property is the fund primarily liable for the corporate debts.
Relation between a Cobpobation and its Stockholdebs as to the Debts of the Cobpobation.—As between themselves, the corporation is the principal debtor, and the stockholders are sureties or guarantors.
Idem. —Release of a Stockholdeb.—Though both the corporation and the stockholders are primarily liable to creditors, yet, as between themselves, the one being the principal debtor, and the others only its sureties, a release of the corporation will release the stockholders, hut a release of thelatterwiUnot discharge the former.
Opinion — Sawyer
Sawyer, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court: This cause was tried by the Court, without a jury, on the 24th of October, 1868; and on the 7th of November following, the Court filed its findings in writing, stating the facts found and conclusions of law separately, as required by the Practice Act, and concluding with a direction to enter judgment for the defendant in pursuance of the findings. The plaintiff having given the defendant notice on the 10th of November of the filing of said findings, on the 14th of November the defendant gave plaintiff notice that he excepted to the findings on the ground that they were not in accordance with the evidence introduced, and served therewith other and different findings, which he claimed to be in accordance with the evidence, and a notice that on the 21st of November he would move the Court to substitute the findings so served for those on file. On hearing the motion, the Court made the substitution, with some slight modification, to all of which the plaintiff excepted, and he now relies on this action of the Court as one of the grounds for reversing the judgment and order denying a new trial. The change, however, was in some minor particulars, and the conclusion of law and judgment are the same as they were upon the finding first filed.
We know of no provision of the Practice Act authorizing the Court to re-examine the evidence upon the motion of one of the parties, after it has once filed its findings and rendered judgment, and on such re-examination to reverse its former action and substitute different findings of fact. Under the Act of 1861, and Section 180 of the Practice Act, as amended [531]in 1866, the Court is authorized to supply omissions and defects. We have often stated the object and scope of these provisions. (Hidden v. Jordan, 28 Cal. 304—5; Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 408; Cowing v. Rogers, 34 Cal. 648; Rice v. Inskeep, Id. 224.) But these provisions do not authorize a re-examination of the evidence for the purpose of correcting former errors, and changing the finding of facts. The mode provided for reviewing its former action by the same Court, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the finding, is by motion for new trial. On the motion for new trial, when the Judge is of opinion that the damages are excessive under the evidence, he may require a portion to be remitted, as a condition of denying a new trial, and in this way, if submitted to, correct the error. Perhaps there may be other errors, which could readily be corrected in this way. But if there is an error of fact affecting the judgment, which cannot be obviated in this mode, we know of but one regular way to correct it, and that is by motion for new trial. (Carpentier v. Gardiner, 29 Cal. 163. See, also, Calderwood v. Pyser, 31 Cal. 337.)
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