Senter v. Davis
Before: Sanderson
Synopsis
Jurisdiction—Specific Performance__The jurisdiction of a Court of Equity to decree specific performance does not turn at all upon the question whether the contract relates to real or personal property, but upon the question whether the breach admits of adequate compensation in damages.
Idem. —If damages at law will be adequate compensation for the breach, specific performance will not be decreed.
Idem.—If non-performanco will embarrass the plaintiff in his business plans, or involve him in- loss which a jury cannot estimate with any degree of certainty, specific performance should be decreed.
Idem in Eespect to Sales of Personal Property.-^ The general rule is, that specific performance of contracts for the sale of personal property will not be decreed; yet, if- the thing bargained for is of unusual distinction or curiosity, or is so related to the business of the plaintiff that non-performance will embarrass or impede him in his business, threatening a loss of profits which a jury cannot correctly estimate, or the like, specific performance will be granted.
Idem. —A party seeking specific performance of contracts for the sale of personal property must state, in his complaint, the peculiar facts upon which he-relies as taking his case out of the general rule that specific performance will not be decreed in relation to such contracts.
Idem.—D. being the owner of the right or privilege to deliver a newspaper to subscribers within a certain district, sold to S., at a price agreed upon, to be thereafter paid, and when paid, D. was to give a bill of sale. S. took possession, and paid .part of the purchase money', when D. turned him out. S. then sued for specific performance; but no further facts being stated showing why damages would not be full compensation, specific performance was denied.
Idem.—A party who relies upon an exception to a general rule, must state the facts which bring his case within it-
Sanderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The complaint seems to have been framed with a view to alternate relief—specific performance, if by the rules of equity the plaintiff is entitled thereto, and if not, damages at law for a breach of the contract. The Court below was of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance, and rendered judgment accordingly. The case comes here upon the judgment roll, without testimony or findings of fact, and the only point made by the defendant is, that the case made by the complaint does not entitle the plaintiffs to the relief which he has obtained.
The plaintiff is a newspaper carrier, and he alleges that it is a general custom in the newspaper trade for the publishers and proprietors of a newspaper to sell -what is called “routes” —that is to say, the exclusive privilege of furnishing or delivering the paper to all of its subscribers residing within a certain designated district; that the carrier receives the paper at the counter of the publishers at an agreed price, and delivers them to the subscribers at a higher price, which is also fixed by the proprietors of the paper, which is denominated the subscription price; that by the custom aforesaid, such routes are regarded as the separate and exclusive property of the carriers, subject to sale and transfer by the carriers, at their pleasure, provided the route is well cared for, and the transfer is not made to a person ivho is objectionable to the proprietors of the paper; that, some twelve years ago, a newspaper called the Daily Bee was established, and is still published in the City of Sacramento; that in accordance with said custom, the proprietors divided the. city into convenient routes, and sold them to the then , newspaper carriers-[453]of said city; that among said routes was one known as the “ J street route,” which, some time prior to the 18th of April, 1867, had come into the ownership and possession of the defendant; and that on that day the plaintiff contracted with the defendant for the purchase of said J street route, and the defendant agreed to sell it for the sum of $1,500; that he was let into possession under this contract, and was to have a bill of sale of the route upon the payment of the purchase money, according to the terms of the contract.
The complaint then proceeds to detail the terms of the agreement, and some changes made by consent as to time of performance on the part of the plaintiff, alleging a part performance, and an offer to perform the rest, with the breach on the part of the defendant, none of which facts, however, are material to the present purpose. Than what has been stated, nothing more is said which illustrates or tends to illustrate the question whether damages at law would not prove, in all respects, full compensation for the wrong alleged to have been committed by the defendant in turning the plaintiff out of the J street route, and refusing to give him a bill of sale, according to the terms of the contract.
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