Moore v. Martin

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1869Published

Before: Sanderson, Thecourt

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Holding. The court held that the underlying judgment was valid against collateral attack, but the sheriff's deed was void because it was executed before the expiration of the statutory six-month redemption period.

Issues

Whether a judgment is valid against collateral attack if the court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.
Whether a sheriff's deed executed in less than six months after a sale is void under the Redemption Law of 1851.
Whether the Redemption Law of 1851 is constitutional as applied to judgments existing prior to its enactment.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If the - Court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter, the judgment is good against a collateral attack, however erroneous it may be.”

“The deed to Quivey from the Sheriff, however, was void, because it was made before the expiration of six months after the sale, for which reason the Sheriff had no power to make it.”

Synopsis

Judgments not Void.—A judgment of the District Court, founded upon a judgment of a Justice of the Peace, which is in excess of his jurisdiction, and therefore void, is erroneous, but not void, and therefore valid as against a collateral attack.

Idem.—If the District Court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the action, its judgment is not void, however erroneous it may be.

Jurisdiction on the Person.—If the judgment of the District Court recites, “Now comes the plaintiff by his attorney, and the defendant in proper person,” the recital is conclusivo in favor of the jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the defendant in a collateral proceeding.

Judicial Sales Valid.—A sale made under a valid, though erroneous judgment, which has not been reversed or set aside, is valid.

Sherbet's Deed Void.—If a Sheriff’s deed be given before the time for redemption has expired, it is void.

Sherbet's Return—Estoppel.—If a Sheriff make a return in these words: “ John Moore, plaintiff’s attorney, was the purchaser at S180, and has paid the costs,” he is not estopped thereby from testifying that the plaintiff, and not his attorney, John Moore, was the purchaser; and if his deed has been lost, that he made it to the plaintiff, and not to his attorney.

Sherbet's Return.—A return, that “John Moore, plaintiff’s attorney, was the purchaser at 5180, and has paid the costs,” means that Moore purchased as attorney, and for the plaintiff.

Constitutional Law. —If, at the time a judgment is rendered, judicial sales aro absolute, and before a sale under it takes placo, a law is passed allowing time for redemption, such law docs not impair the judgment, in the sense of the Constitution prohibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

Sanderson, J., delivered the opinion of theCourt: Neither the papers nor the proceedings in the case of Peter Quivey v. John M. Murphy were prepared or conducted according to the most approved forms, it must be admitted; but we are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the judgment is at least valid as against a collateral attack. And this is so, whether the record, which is to be consulted for the purpose of determining that question (under the Code of 1850, which was then in force,) be held to consist only of the judgment, or to include, also, the other papers,which, under the statute now in force, make a part of the judgment roll. If the - Court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter, the judgment is good against a collateral attack, however erroneous it may be. How stands the case, then, if we take the judgment alone as" constituting the record ? The Court had jurisdiction of the'defendant, for the judgment recites:

[437]“Now comes the plaintiff by his attorney, and the defendant in proper person,” etc. (Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391.) It had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, for it was a money demand for the sum of $300, principal, and $216, interest, due on a judgment of a Justice of the Peace, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant; and the judgment was for that sum. According to the decisions of this Court, made since this judgment was rendered, the judgment of the Justice was void, for excess of jurisdiction; and that of the District Court was, for that reason, erroneous, but not void, and therefore valid as against a collateral attack.

If the other papers be taken as a part of the record, there was an express waiver in writing of process, and a voluntary appearance on the part of the defendant. The cause of action upon which the Justice’s judgment was rendered Avas referred to in the complaint, and stated to have been a promissory note, which was, also, with the judgment of the Justice of the Peace, exhibited to the Court as a part of the plaintiff’s cause of action. In view of these facts, it is doubtful if the judgment of the District Court would be vulnerable, even as against a direct attack. But, as already suggested, it is immaterial whether these papers be considered as a part of the record under the Code of 1850 or not, and we therefore leave the question open.

The judgment being valid—that is to say, not void—and never having been reversed or set aside, the sale of Murphy’s interest in the property was also valid, and the deed from the Sheriff to Quivey, of the 19th of August, 1851, vested the title in the latter, if the deed was not void by reason of its having been made in less than six months after the sale, and if the Court did not err in allowing the Sheriff to prove the execution and delivery of the deed by parol.

Moore v. Martin

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