Quivey v. Baker
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Couhts of Equity Regard the Substance Only.—If A., for his own benefit and without the knowledge of B., who paid no consideration, has a conveyance of land made to B. by a third person, a Court of equity in dealing with the transaction at tho instance of creditors of A., or those claiming under him, will treat tho land as the property of A., and regard him as the real party in interest.
Conveyance in Fee Carries After-acquired Title.—If A., having no title, makes a conveyance in fee of land to B„, and afterward for his own benefit procures tho holder of tho real title to make a conveyance thereof to C., (C. paying no consideration,) this conveyance to C. will, in equity, inure to the benefit of B. and his grantees in all proceedings between 0. and B., or his grantees.
Deed in Fee Carries After-acquired Title taken in Name of Stranger.— The principle that if a vendor convey the fee in land to which he has no title, and to which ho afterwards acquires the true title, the title thus acquired shall inure to tho benefit of his vendee, cannot be defeated in equity by taking the after acquired title in tho name of a third person who has no real interest in the transaction.
Quitclaim Deed does not Carry After-acquired Title.—The principle that a title acquired by tho vendor after a conveyance by him in fee inures to the benefit of his vendee, does not apply when the vendor’s deed was a quitclaim, cvcd if it contains a qualified warranty against a specified adverse claim set up by a third party.
Equity Reforms Decrees and Sheriffs’ Deeds.—A Court of equity will reform a mortgage by correcting a mistake, and after it has been merged in a decree of foreclosure, and tho mortgaged property has been sold, will, if the mistake in tho mortgage has been carried into the decree and Sheriff’s deed, reform them. It will go back to the original mistake and correct all subsequent mistakes which grow out of it.
Mistake in Mortgage and Decree of Foreclosure.—If there was a mistake in the mortgage in tho description of the property, and the same mistake exists in the decree and Sheriff’s deed, equity will go back to the original transaction and reform all three so as to make them conform to the original intention of the parties.
Jurisdiction of the Person—Judgment by Default.—A judgment by default is valid if it contains a recital that the defendant was personally served with process, although tho certificate of service of summons found in the judgment roll fails to show that tho service was sufficient. [
By the Court, Crockett, J.; In June, 1850, one Joseph S. Buckle, being indebted to Peter Quivey, agreed to make a mortgage to him on certain real estate then owned by Buckle in the City of San José to secure the debt. Among other property intended to be included in the mortgage, was the lot in contest in this case, which is Lot Six, in Block Two, Bange Three Borth, of the base line; But the scrivener, in drawing up the mortgage, made a mistake in the description of this lot, and described it as Lot Six, in Block Three, and Bange Two Borth, of the base line; simply transposing the numbers of the block and range. The mistake, however, appears not to have been immediately discovered, and after a time Quivey commenced his action to foreclose the mortgage, describing the property in his complaint by tjie same erroneous description contained in the mortgage. In) the decree of foreclosure and order of sale there was the same erroneous description; but, in makt [469]ing the sale, the Sheriff pointed out to the bidders the property in contest as that which he was about to sell, being ignorant of the mistake in the description. At this sale Peter Quivey became the purchaser, and in due time obtained the Sheriff's deed, and thereupon entered into the possession of the lot in contest. But the same erroneous description is found in this deed, which followed, in this respect, the mortgage, decree of foreclosure, and order of sale. It further appears that there was not in San José any property corresponding to the erroneous description. There was no Lot Six in Block Three and Range Two Uorth, of the base line.
Subsequently Peter Quivey sold the lot to one Ward, and conveyed it to him by quitclaim deed and by a correct description; and at the same time, as the Court finds, executed and delivered to him a separate instrument, wherein he agreed that if one Chabolla, who was then claiming the lot, afterwards recovered it, he would refund to Ward the purchase money paid. The title of Ward, by proper mesne conveyance, subsequently vested in the intervenor, Cole, who, in May, 1864, commenced an action against Ruckle, Quivey, and the Sheriff, Tontz, to correct the error in the description, and filed a proper notice of lis pendens. In March, 1865, whilst said action was pending, Ruckle conveyed the lot by absolute deed to the plaintiff in this action, Francis M. Quivey, who was then a young man about twenty-three years old, and a son of said Peter Quivey. It appears in the case that the only consideration for this conveyance was the release by Peter Quivey of the balance due to him by Ruckle of the mortgage debt and other demands; that the plaintiff paid no consideration for the conveyance, had no agency in procuring it to be made, and no knowledge of it until some time thereafter; and that the deed was taken in the name of the plaintiff at the request of his father, the said Peter Quivey. Upon these facts the plaintiff commenced this action in the usual form against the defendant Baker to recover the possession of the lot. But Baker was in possession only as the tenant of Cole, who thereupon intervened
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