Lawton v. Gordon

By the Court, Rhodes, J. : The material facts upon which the question in this case arises are these: Barron conveyed to Reed the undivided two fifths of a certain quartz lode and mining claim. The deed was filed for record in the Recorder’s office on the 6th day of July, 1864,' and before it was actually recorded it was taken from the office by a third party, by means of a letter of Reed to the Recorder, and about the twenty-sixth of September it was returned to the Recorder’s office, and was recorded on the first or second of October following.

Barron conveyed the same premises to Reichling on the [20520]th of September, 1864, and the deed was filed for record the same day. Reichling, while negotiating the purchase, went to the Recorder’s office to search the records, and was there told by the Deputy Recorder that there was a deed from Barron to Reed for the property, which had been filed for record, but withdrawn before it was -recorded. The plaintiffs claim under Reichling, and the defendants under Reed.

The question presented is, whether .Reichling purchased with notice of Reed’s deed. That deed having been withdrawn by the direction of the grantee from the Recorder’s office before it was recorded, and before Reichling purchased, we shall assume, without discussion, that the withdrawal of the deed suspended the operation, as to that deed, of the provision of the twenty-fifth section of the Act concerning conveyances, which' declares that the conveyance, from the time it is filed for record in the Recorder’s office, shall impart notice of its contents to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. The rule, in respect to notice, that whatever is sufficient to direct the attention of a purchaser to the prior rights and equities of third parties, and to enable him to ascertain their nature by inquiry, will operate as notice, is not questioned by counsel, and it has been so often affirmed that a citation of authorities is unnecessary. The purchaser received definite and certain information of the existence of Reed’s deed, and this information was worthy of credit, for it came from one who had seen the deed and filed it for record. Would any reasonable man, who was contemplating the purchase of property, after having received that information, doubt as to his duty to pursue the inquiry, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title ? He certainly would not hesitate, unless he was laboring under the mistake of law that a recorded deed always took precedence of an unrecorded deed.

The information itself being sufficient in all respects to put the purchaser upon his inquiry, the only remaining question is, whether the information must come from a person