People v. Nelson
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Appeal from the District Court, Sixth Judicial District, Yolo County.
This action was commenced in a Justice^ Court, to recover a personal judgment for a tax amounting to thirty-five dollars and twenty cents. The complaint was in writing. The defendant answered, and the Court made an order transferring the cause to the District Court for trial, because the answer put in issue the legality of a tax. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained in the District Court, with leave to the plaintiff to amend, whereupon the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, praying for a personal judgment against defendant, Nelson, and a separate judgment against the real estate, and that the same be sold to satisfy the judgment. The defendant moved to strike out the amended complaint because it had no relation to the action originally commenced, that being an action at law to recover money, and the amendment being a chancery proceeding to enforce a lien upon real estate. The Court denied the motion. The Court then, after striking out the answer, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
The other facts are stated in the opinion- of the Court.
By the Court, Crockett, J.: The motion to strike out the amended complaint was properly denied. A similar question was before us in Mahlstadt v. Blanc, 34 Cal. 577, and we think that case decisive that the ruling was correct. The proceeding in respect to the defendant’s answer was somewhat anomalous. The Court first sustained a demurrer to it, and afterwards struck out the answer. There can be only one theory on which the Court proceeded in dealing thus summarily with the answer, to wit: that this being a suit for taxes, the statute prescribes what the answer must be, and prohibits any other. The tax in this case was levied for school purposes, under section ninety-eight of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for a system of Common Schools,” approved March 24th, 1866. (Stats. 1865-6, p. 383.) This section, after authorizing the Trustees of the School District to levy a tax in certain cases, and prescribing the mode of doing it, after the question shall [378]have heen submitted to the qualified electors of the-district, provides that said tax, “if not paid within the time limited in the next succeeding section for its payment, shall be recovered by suit, in the same manner and with the same costs as delinquent State and county taxes.” The next section provides that after the taxes shall have become delinquent, “the Trustees shall deposit said roll with the District Attorney, who shall proceed to collect the delinquent taxes in the manner prescribed by law for other delinquent tax.”
The statute then in force for the collection of delinquent State and county taxes provides that in suits brought for their collection the defendant shall be permitted to answer only: First, that the taxes were paid before suit; second, that they have been paid, with the costs, since suit brought, or that the property was exempt from taxation; third, denying all interest in the property at the date of the assessment; fourth, that the land is situate in another county, and the tax has been paid; fifth, fraud in the assessment or fraud in failing to comply with the provisions of the Revenue Act, by which fraud the party or property assessed has sufferd injury. (Stats. 1863, p. 712.)
The answer in this case not only denied that an election was held for the purpose of submitting to the electors the question of the tax, but also denied almost every other material allegation of the complaint. It then alleges 'that the Trustees fraudulently neglected to comply with the provisions of the statute authorizing the levying of the school tax, and fraudulently levied or pretended to levy a tax for an amount beyond that which they were authorized by law to levy; and that at said pretended election more than twenty illegal votes were received, without which there was a majority against levying the tax; and that the Trustees and Judges of Flection fraudulently neglected and refused to prepare a poll list, as required by law to be kept, for reference at said election. If it be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the statute of 1863 above quoted was applicable and of controlling force in respect to the answer, we
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