Arnold v. Skaggs
Before: Sanderson
Synopsis
Evidence.—Where I., who was conducting a stable business, gave to the Assessor for the purposes of assessment for taxes, a list of the personal property used in said business, which was conducted in a building owned by S., as the property of the latter, and thereafter S. appeared before the Board of Equalization to procure a reduction of said assessment: Held, in an action against S. for goods delivered and used in said stable business, and in which action the main issue was whether said goods had been sold to I. or S., that said assessment was competent evidence as tending to prove that said goods were sold to 8.
New Trial on ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.—Motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be regarded with suspicion and disfavor. In such cases the motion must be supported by the affidavit of the moving party that he did not know of the newly discovered evidence, and usually by the affidavits of the newly discovered witnesses stating what they know and will testify. The affidavit of the party cannot be received in lieu of the affidavits of such witnesses, unless for good cause shown it appears that the affidavits of the latter cannot be obtained in time, or in such further time as may have been granted for that purpose.
Idem.—A party who relies on such ground must make a strong case by the best evidence obtainable, both in respect to diligence on his part in preparing for the trial, and as to the truth and materiality of the newly discovered evidence.
Idem.—In such a case the moving party must show by his own affidavit that the new evidence was not known to him at the time of the trial. Upon that question, the affidavits of other persons are not sufficient.
By the Court, Sanderson, J.: 1. Taken in connection with the other evidence, which shows that the defendant appeared before the Board of Equalization and applied for a reduction of the assessment made upon the list given by Ingles as his agent, thereby ratifying the act of Ingles as his, we think the list itself was relevant and admissible. The listing of the property which was in use in the business by Ingles in the name of the defendant, the knowledge of the defendant that Ingles had so listed it, which is shown by his appearance before the Board of Equalization to procure a reduction of the assessed value of the property, tended directly to prove that the property used in the business was his, that Ingles was acting as his agent, and hence that the business carried on at the stables might also be his.
2. We cannot grant a new trial upon the ground that the Court found contrary to the evidence. The evidence is conflicting.
3. The showing in support of the motion, under the head of newly discovered evidence, is also insufficient.
The affidavit of the defendant fails to show that he was [687]not cognizant of the alleged insanity of Arnold before or at the time of the trial. The affidavits of Frey and Thomas both show, it is true, that they informed the defendant of Arnold’s supposed insanity after the trial,' and that they verily believe that he (the defendant) was ignorant of it until so informed by them; but their belief is insufficient. The defendant himself should have spoken upon the question. The fact that he is silent justifies the inference that Frey and Thomas are mistaken in their belief, and that he knew all about the alleged insanity of Arnold at or before the trial. In applications of this kind, as well as in other legal proceedings, the best evidence within reach must be produced. The defendant must have known whether the alleged insanity of Arnold was first made known to him after the trial, and his sworn statement that it was would be much more satisfactory than the mere belief of any number of other persons. (Baker v. Joseph, 16 Cal. 180.)
As to the witness Covey, the ease not only fails to show diligence in preparing for trial, but shows negligence. He was called by the defendant as a witness, and examined at the trial; and the most ordinary diligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel would have led to the discovery of what further, if anything, he knew about the case. That the discovery, under such circumstances, was not made until after the trial, must be attributed to negligence.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)