Hornblower v. Duden
Before: Sanderson
Synopsis
Powers of Boards of Supervisors.—Boards of Supervisors possess the power, as incidental to that of buying, selling, and leasing of property, and the management, care, and preservation thereof, as conferred by statute, (Stats. 1855, Sec. 9, p. 51,) to take all legal measures necessary to that end, by suit or otherwise, and therein are vested with large discretionary powers.
Idem—Exercise of Discretion.—If, in the exercise of their judgment and discretion, the Board of Supervisors conceive that the interests of the county are involved in a certain question, and thereupon take legal measures, by suit or otherwise, to advance or protect those interests, the expense thus incurred becomes a legal charge against the county, notwithstanding the Courts might ultimately hold that the Board had adopted the wrong remedy, or were entitled to no remedy whatever.
Management of Railroad Stock owned by a County.—A county owning stock in a railroad company is directly interested, like any other stockholder, in the conduct and management of its affairs, and, as a consequence, in the selection of its officers. The county would have a right, through her Board of Supervisors, to contest the election of such officers, if deemed to have been illegal, and to that end to adopt any remedy she might be advised was legal, and the expense thus incurred would become a legal charge against the county. Courts can exercise no control over the judgment and discretion possessed by Boards of Supervisors in such cases.
Idem—Employment of Counsel.—Boards of Supervisors have power to employ other counsel than the District Attorney to assist in or to conduct the prosecution or defense of any suit to which the county is a party, which power extends equally to suits to which she is a party upon the record and to those in the prosecution or defense of which she has or is supposed to have some interest. The judgment and discretion of the Board in the exercise of this power arc not open to review by the Courts.
By the Court, Sanderson, J.: The ultimate question involved in this case is whether the plaintiff’s claim is a legal charge against the county. On the part of the appellant it is insisted that it is not—first, because the services for which the claim is made were rendered in a matter in which the county had no interest, and in respect to which, therefore, the Board of Supervisors had no power to' take any action whatever; and second, because if the matter in respect to which the services were rendered was a matter in which the county was interested, and in which, therefore, the Board had power to act, the Board, nevertheless, had competent counsel in the person of the District Attorney, and therefore had no power to employ the plaintiff’s assignor.
The first proposition seems to be founded upon what we consider to be an erroneous idea, viz: that if a Board of Supervisors participates in a legal controversy in which it may appear, at the outcome, that the county had no legal interest, the whole action of the Board in the matter must be considered as in excess of their jurisdiction, and therefore [669]void. If such were the case, the power of the Board to act in all legal controversies, and in respect thereto incur expenses on behalf of the county, would depend entirely upon the result of the contest; if favorable to the county, the expenses incurred would become a legal charge against the county; if unfavorable, the parties rendering the services would be left without compensation. The power of the Board cannot, as we consider, be measured by such a rule.
Boards of Supervisors are vested with a variety of power’s touching the administration of county affairs, among which are the buying, selling, and leasing of property, and the management, care, and preservation thereof, and, as incidental thereto, the talcing of all legal measures necessary to that end, by suit or otherwise; and in the exercise of those powers they are necessarily endowed with a large discretion. (Stats. 1855, Sec. 9, p. 51.) If, in the exercise of their judgment and discretion, they conceive that the interests of the county are involved in a certain question, and thereupon take legal measures, by suit or otherwise, to advance or protect those interests, the expenses incurred would become, in our judgment, a legal charge against the county, notwithstanding the Courts might ultimately hold that they had adopted the wrong remedy, or were entitled to no remedy whatever. We do not, of course, intend to be understood as implying that the county would be liable in a case where she obviously had no interest. There must, undoubtedly, be some ground for the action of the Board, some reason for supposing that the interests of the county are involved. She cannot be made liable in respect to a matter in which she is manifestly not concerned, by any action of the Board.
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