Dougherty v. Hitchcock
Before: Rhodes, Sawyer, Sprague
Synopsis
Street Assessment in San Francisco — Mode of its Authentication. — An assessment made by the Superintendent of Streets of San Francisco, to cover the sum due for the improvement of a street, is an official act, and must be attested by his official signature.
Idem, as Evidence.—An assessment not thus officially attested, though attached to the diagram and the Superintendent’s warrant, which were in due form and properly attested, does not constitute a valid assessment, and is not admissible in evidence, either by itself or in connection with the warrant and diagram.
Contracts and Assessments for Street Improvements. — Under the statute regulating street improvements in San Francisco the Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution of intention to grade Clay street from Taylor to Jones and from Jones to Leavenworth streets, and the crossing of Clay and Jones streets, and subsequently ordered said work to be done, and the clerk advertised for proposals for its performance, notifying bidders to put in separate bids for each block and said crossing. The Board awarded a contract for the whole work. The only contract entered into by the Superintendent of Streets, etc., with the successful bidder, was for the grading of one block only—that from Jones and Leavenworth streets. Held, first, that the resolution of intention and its publication constituted the sole authority of the Board to proceed, in the statute mode, to order said work to be done, and that thereby no authority was conferred to act upon any other or different work; second, that the work designated in the resolution of intention constituted one distinct and entire subject matter ; third, that the resolution of award constituted the sole authority to the Super ntendent, who acted ministerially only in making a contract under it, and that the contract, by reason of variance between its terms and the resolution of award, was unauthorized and void; and fourth, that a contract duly authorized under said Act, and executed according to its requirements, is indispensable to the validity of any assessment upon property to pay for street improvements.
Idem—Appeal in, to the Board.—In such case the defect in the contract is not cured by the failure of the lot owners to appeal for its correction to the Board of Supervisors, because, had an appeal been taken the defect could not have been remedied by the Board.
Authority of Board of Supervisors to make Street Improvements. — Under the provisions of sections three and eight of the Act of 1862, (Stats. 1862, p. 391,) the jurisdiction is vested in the Board of Supervisors to determine whether the whole or a portion, and if a portion what portion of a street improvement shall be done as a single improvement. It is necessary to a proper execution of this important power, and to protect the interests of property owners, that such determination should be distinctly and clearly expressed, so as to enable those interested to act intelligently. When so expressed the subsequent proceedings of the Board must be in strict pursuance thereof as their sole authority, and if not so pursued, such subsequent proceedings will be void—Per Mr. Chief Justice Sawyer.
Opinion — Rhodes
By the Court, Rhodes, J.: It is provided by section nine of the Act of 1862, relative to the improvement of streets in San Francisco, that after the contractor has fulfilled his contract, etc., the Superintendent shall make an assessment to cover the sum due for the work performed and incidental expenses. This is an ■ official act on the part of the Superintendent, and its character and authenticity can be attested in only one manner, and that is the official signature of the Superintendent. Its official character must be made to appear on its face. In Himm[522]elman v. Danos, ante, 441, it is held that the copies of the assessment, warrant, and diagram found in the Superintendent’s book could not be considered as a record until signed by the Superintendent, because the making of the record was an official act, and its official character must be made to appear on its face; The document cannot be regarded as an assessment, and, standing by itself, is was clearly inadmissible.
But it is contended that it was helped out by the warrant, which was signed by the Superintendent, and countersigned by the Auditor, and was attached to the assessment. This position might be maintained if the two papers constituted only one official document; but they are distinct, and each must be in truth what it purports to be before they can be attached together for the purposes specified in the Act. The position contended for would make a summons without the signature of the clerk valid, if it was attached to the other papers constituting the judgment roll.
It is further contended, that as the statute, in providing for the assessment, warrant, and diagram, expressly requires only one—the warrant—to be signed by the Superintendent, it was not intended that either of the others should be signed, and the rule, that the mention of the one is the exclusion of the others, is relied upon to sustain the position. There would be great merit in the argument if either of these documents could be regarded as official, in the absence of an official signature. Its application in respect to the signature of thé Auditor is very apparent. But the statutory requirement'that the warrant should be signed by the Superintendent was an unnecessary repetition, for the issuing of the warrant as necessarily imports and includes its signature as the averment that a summons was issued by the clerk imports that it received his official signature. This view is illustrated by the positions taken in Himmelman v. Danos in respect to the provisions of the next section of the statute. It is there provided that the Superintendent shall record the assessment, diagram, warrant, and the return, and the contract
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