Treadwell v. Davis
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Statement on Appeal.—When questions of law alone are sought to be reviewed on .appeal, and a statement of facts be necessary to their explanation, a statement on appeal, rather than a motion for new trial and statement thereon, is the appropriate mode of procedure.
Pledge op Goods—Rights of Pledgee.—Plaintiff and Templeton were severally creditors of Thompson. Templeton, as security for his debt, held in pledge Thompson’s goods, of greater value than the sum of both plaintiff’s and Temple-ton’s debts. By an arrangement between them, plaintiff guaranteed to Templeton the payment-of his debt, and received from him an assignment and the possession of said goods, in pledge to secure the payment of the debts of both plaintiff and Templeton. Thompson, who was not a party to this arrangement between plaintiff and Templeton, afterwards expressed himself gratified at its consummation. Thereafter defendant, as Sheriff of the City and County of San Francisco, levied upon and took said goods from plaintiff’s possession, under a lawful writ of attachment against the property of Thompson, issued out in the suit of Martin v. Thompson, whereupon plaintiff brought this action against defendant for said seizure, and to recover the full value of said goods. Held, first, that Templeton lost his lien on the goods, as pledgee, by surrendering them to plaintiff and taking said guaranty for his debt; second, that by said arrangement between Templeton and plaintiff, and the subsequent assent thereto by Thompson, plaintiff acquired, as pledgee, a valid lien on said goods to secure the payment of both said debts; and third, that plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, and his right of recovery is not limited to his interest only, as pledgee of the goods, but extends to the whole value of the goods.
Idem—Measure of Recovery by Pledgee for Conversion of Pledged Goods.— In an action by the pledgee against a stranger for the conversion of pledged property, the rule is, that plaintiff is entitled to recover its full value; but if against the owner, or one acting in privity with him, then only for plaintiff’s special interest therein as pledgee.
Idem—Liability of Sheriff to Pledgee for Seizing Goods.—In an action by a pledgee against a Sheriff for a conversion of goods pledged, the Sheriff who has seized them under a lawful writ in his hands will be treated as in privity with the owner, the pledgor, provided he has pursued the law in making such seizure, and will be held only for plaintiff’s special interest in the goods; but in any other event, he will be treated as a stranger, and held for their full value.
Idem—Mode of Attaching Goods in Hands of Third Party.—Under the provisions of sections one hundred and twenty-five, one hundred and twenty-seven, one hundred and twenty-eight, and two hundred and seventeen of the Practice Act it is provided, that whilst the interest of a pledgor of property is subject to execution, and may be reached in the hands of the pledgee when a third party, yet this can only be done by serving and enforcing a garnishment on the pledgee, and not by a seizure of the pledge.
By the Court, Crockett, J.: The record in this case presents only the following questions which we deem it necessary to consider, to wit:
First—Can the errors complained of he properly brought before this Court by a statement on appeal, or could this have been accomplished only by a motion for new trial, supported by a proper statement ?
Second—Was the lien which Templeton held upon the goods pledged to him by Thompson lost or destroyed, and if so, did the plaintiff acquire a new and valid lien by virtue of the arrangement entered into between him, Templeton and Harpending ?
Third—Was the agreement by Templeton, and subsequently by the plaintiff, to hold the surplus for the benefit of Toland, void, as being an assignment for the benefit of creditors, in contravention of the insolvent laws of this State, and if so, did this bar the plaintiff’s right of recovery ?
Fourth—If the plaintiff was entitled to recover, what was the proper measure of damages ? Was he entitled to recover the value of the whole property, or only the value of his special interest in it ?
In respect to the first point, we think the errors sought to be reviewed are properly presented by a statement on appeal, and there was no need for a motion for new trial. As we understand the record, there is no controversy as to any material fact, and the action of the Court below is sought to be reviewed on questions of law alone. In such cases a statement on appeal is not only a proper method, but is often the most convenient, expeditious and economical mode of bringing the alleged errors before this Court. (Hutton v. [605]Reed, 25 Cal. 478; Estate of Boyd, 25 Cal. 511; Harper v. Minor, 27 Cal. 107.)
On the second point the proposition of the counsel for the defendant is, that when Templeton transferred the warehouse receipts to the plaintiff, hut retained the debt against Thompson, he thereby voluntarily parted with the possession of the pledge, which became severed from the debt, and the lien was thus extinguished. This is doubtless true in respect to Templeton. After surrendering the receipts to the plaintiff, and talcing from him a written guaranty of the debt, he lost his lien on the goods. But did the plaintiff acquire a new lien, not only for the security of his own debt, but as an indemnity against the liability which he incurred to Temple-ton ? This must depend upon the fact whether Thompson consented to the transaction when it was made, or ratified it afterward. Hothing could be plainer than that the plaintiff acquired a valid lien, provided it was mutually agreed between himself, Templeton and Thompson that the plaintiff should guaranty the debt to Templeton, and should hold the goods for his indemnity and as a security for his own debt. It appears that Thompson was not present at the transaction between the plaintiff and Templeton. But on being informed of it by Harpending, the next day, he said he “was glad the arrangement had been made.” This was a sufficient ratification, and made the transaction as valid as if Thompson had been present in person, consenting to it at the time. The plaintiff, therefore, acquired a valid lien on the goods.
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