People v. Cronin

Indictment for. Murder—Averment of What Pacts Sufficient.—Where, in an indictment for murder, the averment was that the homicide was committed ct by some means, instruments, and weapons to the Grand Jury unknown,” the indictment was held sufficient.

Idem—Indictments Generally.—Indictments, in matter of averment, are sufficient if they allege all the acts or facts which have been used by the Legislature in defining the particular offense charged.

Idem.—Under the provisions of the statute, that “ all the forms of pleading in criminal actions, and the rules by which the sufficiency of pleadings is determined, shall be those prescribed by this Act,” (Criminal Practice Act, Sec. 235,) the bench and bar must search in the provisions of the statute for the form of an indictment and for the rules by which its sufficiency shall be determined, rather than in the common law.

Indictment for Murder.—Under the provisions of section nineteen of the Act concerning crimes and punishments, and section two hundred and thirty-nine of the Criminal Practice Act, the crime of murder, which must be stated in the indictment with directness and certainty, consists in the killing of a human being unlawfully, with malice aforethought; the .manner and means of its accomplishment need not be stated, because not necessary to constitute a complete offense.

Form of Indictment for Murder.—An indictment containing a statement of the venue, together with the formal commencement prescribed by section two hundred and thirty-eight of the Criminal Practice Act, which avers according to this form, to wit: (t That A. B., on the 29th day of July, 1866, at the County of Marin, within said State, feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought did kill and murder C. D.,” etc., contains all the ultimate or issuable facts, and all that need be stated, under our system, in an indictment for murder.

Instructions—Circumstantial Evidence.—Where the Court below instructed the jury that((in order to convict, circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence :” held, that it was not error.

Circumstantial Evidence.—Where the evidence is entirely circumstantial, yet is not only consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but inconsistent with any other rational conclusion, the law makes it the duty of the jury to convict, notwithstanding such evidence may not be as satisfactory to their minds as the direct testimony of credible eye witnesses.

Idem—Caution Concerning, to Jury by Court.—Where counsel for defense made persistent attacks, before the jury, upon circumstantial evidence as furnishing insufficient proof of crime to justify convictions, founded upon those rare cases of conviction of innocent persons thereon, to be found in the books : held, that it was the duty of the Court to caution the jury against attaching too much importance to the teachings of such cases.