Hills v. Sherwood

By the Court, Sawyer, J. : The defendants are sued as executors of one James Stokes, to recover the purchase money paid for a tract of land conveyed by Stokes to plaintiff. The conveyance of Stokes as alleged in the complaint, and not denied in the answer, contained a covenant “ that the original Mexican title of said land was valid, and in the event that the said original title to the said land should not be confirmed by the Courts of the United States, before which it was then pending, upon the final adjudication of the same, the said Stokes, his heirs, executors and administrators should and would be liable to the plaintiff for the sum named and mentioned in the said deed as the consideration thereof.” It is averred in the complaint “ that the said original Mexican title to the said land was thereafter—viz: on the 9th day of November, A. D. 1859, by the District Court of the United States for the Northérn District of California, the Court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the same—declared and adjudged to be invalid, and that no appeal was taken from the said decision of the District Court of the United States, within the time required by law, and that the said decision thereafter—viz: on the 9th day of November, 1864—became final, and thereby the said covenant of the said Stokes became broken,” etc.

The answer in express terms admits the making of the covenant as set forth; that the title to the land was on or about the 9th day of November, 1859, as they are informed and believe, on the 12th of November, 1859, declared and adjudged by the said District Court to be invalid; that no appeal was ever taken, and that thereby the said covenant of the said Stokes became broken. They then “ deny that on the 9th of November, A. D. 1864, or at any other time in [478]the year 1864, the said decision of the District Court for the Northern District of California became final, or that any cause of action accrued to the plaintiff within the year 1864; hut aver the fact to be, that said decision of said District Court became final and operative on the 12th day of November, 1859, and that a cause of action then accrued to plaintiff against said James Stokes.”

The cause was submitted on the pleadings, and defendant had judgment.

The only averment of the complaint denied—that the judgment of the District Court became final on the 9th day of November, 1859—is the statement of a conclusion of law drawn from the facts averred in the complaint, and admitted in the answer. If the judgment was a “ final adjudication ” upon the title from the time it was rendered by the District Court, within the meaning of the covenant, then this action, which was not commenced till December 12th, 1865, was barred by the Statute of Limitations; upon that hypothesis the right of action accrued either November 9th or 12th, 1859, as admitted by the answer. But if the adjudication did not become final, within the meaning of the covenant, till the time for appeal expired, which was five years after the rendition of the judgment of the District Court rejecting the claim, (United States v. Pacheco, 20 How. 261,) the action was brought in time. A judgment may he a “ final adjudication ” in different, senses. It may he final as to the Court which renders it, without being final as to the subject matter. “ The last decree of an inferior Court is final in relation to the power of that Court, hut not in relation to the property itself, unless it he acquiesced in.” (United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103.) Although a judgment may be final with reference to the Court which pronounced it, and, as such, be the subject of an appeal, yet it is not necessarily final with reference to the property, or rights affected, so long as it is subject to appeal and liable to be reversed. The “ final adjudication ” intended by the parties to the covenant in question was, doubtless, an adjudication final as