Hathaway v. Davis
Before: Sanderson, Sawyer
Synopsis
Attachment Law. — An undertaking on appeal is an express contract for the direct payment of money in the sense of the statute in relation to attachments.
When Attachment should be Dissolved.—If the complaint states no cause of action, and does not admit of amendment, the attachment should he dissolved.
Idem.—If the complaint can he made good hy amendment, the plaintiff should he allowed to amend, pending the motion to dissolve the attachment.
Costs in this Court.—Costs in this Court follow the judgment unless otherwise specially directed hy the Court.
Da3iages in this Court.—Damages for a frivolous appeal, given by the three hundred and forty-eighth section of the Practice Act, cannot he recovered in an action upon the undertaking on appeal, unless they have been specially awarded hy this Court.
Defence to Action upon Undertaking on Appeal.— If the appeal has been considered by the appellate Court, and the judgment helow affirmed, a want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate Court cannot he shown in defence to an action upon tho undertaking on appeal.
Death of a Surety on Undertaking on Appeal.—If one of the sureties on an undertaking on appeal dies before suit, the respondent does not forfeit his right of action against the other sureties hy failing to present his claim against the estate of the deceased surety.
Opinion — Sanderson
By the Court, Sanderson, J.: This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to dissolve an attachment. The action is against sureties on an appeal bond, which is in the ordinary form of an undertaking on appeal where a stay of proceedings is sought. It contains two premises. 1st. “ That the appellant will pay all the damages and costs which may be awarded against the defendant on the appeal, not exceeding three hundred dollars;” and, 2d. “ That if the judgment appealed from, or any part thereof, be affirmed, the appellant shall pay the amount directed to be paid thereby, or the part of such amount, as [166]to which the same shall he affirmed, if affirmed only in part, and all damages and costs which shall be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal.” The question presented is whether this undertaking is a “ contract for the direct payment of money” within the meaning of the one hundred and twentieth section of the Practice Act relating to attachments.
The language of the statute is that a plaintiff may have an attachment “ in an action upon a contract, express or implied, for the direct payment of money,” etc.
So far as we are advised this precise language is peculiar to our statute. We do not find it, nor language substantially like it, in the statutes of any other State to which our attention has been called, and we find no little difficulty in coming to a satisfactory conclusion as to the precise meaning which the Legislature intended to convey by its use. It is very clear that the cause of action . must be for the recovery of money only, and must arise out of contract, either exprése or implied; and it is equally clear that an attachment is not allowed in all cases arising out of contract where compensation in money can be recovered. It is further apparent that the distinguishing features lie in the words “ direct payment.” The defendant must have contracted for the “ direct payment of money,” or his goods cannot be attached. But what does “direct payment” mean?—or what does indirect payment mean ? Whoever undertakes to answer these questions in a manner at all satisfactory to himself will first come to the conclusion that the Legislature has expressed its will in language not a little obscure. The Legislature is said to employ words not technical in their ordinary and popular sense.
What meaning would the unprofessional man give to the words in question ? As to the word “ payment,” he would answer promptly: “it is the delivery of money by one person from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due,” but when he undertakes to draw the distinction between a direct and an indirect delivery of money he will not answer so readily, if at all. “ Direct ” means straightforward, not crooked, not winding, not circuitous, not side
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