Masten v. Griffing
Before: Shafter
Synopsis
Nonsuit.—A nonsuit is proper if the plaintiff's evidence does not tend to prove the cause of action set up in the complaint.
Idem.—If the complaint states the cause of action to be an agreement of the defendant to pay the plaintiff a certain sum if the plaintiff procures a purchaser who will agree to buy defendant’s land at a price named, evidence that the plaintiff found a purchaser who agreed to buy if defendant would lease the land and pay a stipulated rent therefor for three years ensuing the conveyance, does not tend to make out the cause of action stated in the complaint, and the defendant is entitled to a nonsuit.
Legal Effect of Evidence.—In passing on the legal effect of the plaintiff’s evidence, the examinations in chief are not to be detached from the cross examinations.
Failure to prove Cause of Action Stated.—If the alleged cause of action is for services for having found a purchaser who agreed to buy defendant’s land at a certain price, evidence that plaintiff found a person who would agree to buy if defendant would first take a lease for three years and give security for the rent, and that defendant did not take the lease, but merely agreed to do so and give security, and that the-purchaser did not accept of such agreement, does not show that plaintiff found a purchaser who agreed to buy at any price.
Contract in Duplicate.—If a contract is drawn up in duplicate and signed by one party, and the other takes both copies and returns them the next day without signing either, and declines to sign unless a new provision is inserted, the contract does not bind either party.
By the Court, Shafter, J.: This is an action to recover the sum of three thousand dollars for services alleged to have been performed for the defendant by one Henry Leffingwell, as broker. The plaintiff claims as assignee of Leffingwell. The plaintiff was non-suited at the trial, and the only question presented is whether the evidence put in by the plaintiff in his opening tended to prove the cause of action set up in the complaint. (Cravens v. Dewey, 13 Cal. 40.) We are of the opinion that the case was not supported by the evidence upon which the plaintiff rested, and that the nonsuit was therefore properly directed.
First—The complaint charged that the defendant promised Leffingwell that if he “ would procure a purchaser for certain premises who would agree to purchase the same, that he, the said defendant, would pay the said Leffingwell, as his com[115]pensation for procuring such purchaser, such sum of money exceeding the sum of sixty-two thousand dollars as the purchaser should agree to pay for said property.” It was further alleged that Leffingwell did thereafter “ procure a purchaser for said property, who did agree to purchase the same at and for the sum of sixty-live thousand dollars, gold coin of the United States; and the said defendant did then and there contract and agree in writing, under his hand, to sell and convey to- the purchaser so procured by the said Leffingwell as aforesaid the said premises before mentioned.”
According to these allegations Leffingwell was to be entitled to commissions in the event of his finding a person who “ would agree ” to purchase the land at a sum exceeding sixty-two thousand' dollars; the defendant being required to do nothing on his part except to sell, or to agree to sell and convey the land. The contract on which the commissions were cast was, in short, to be land for money, and money for land. Admitting, for the present, that the evidence of the plaintiff tended to prove that the agreement between the plaintiff and Leffingwell was set forth correctly in the complaint, still there .was no evidence tending to prove that Leffingwell ever found a party who either agreed, or would agree, to pay anything in excess of sixty-two thousand dollars, or any sum whatever, for the land alone, as alleged. The evidence was, at the most, that one Livingston, by Leffingwell’s procurement, offered to pay, or to agree to pay, sixty-five thousand dollars for the land, in the event that the defendant would lease the property of him, Livingston, for three years ensuing the conveyance and delivery of possession, for the sum of twelve hundred dollars per month, payable monthly, with satisfactory guaranty for the payment of the rent; and to pay all taxes that might be levied upon the property during the continuance of the term. However meritorious the services of Leffingwell may have been in procuring the purchaser on these terms, it is sufficient to say, that the terms were radically different from those upon which
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