Rondell v. Fay
Before: Shafter
Synopsis
Evidence of Incorporation.—Testimony tending to show that a company is a corporation de facto, dispenses with strict proof of the corporate character, and precludes the party offering it from afterwards disputing the company’s right to act as a corporation.
Testimony as to Corporate Character.—If the plaintiff, in his opening, introduces testimony tending to show that a company is a corporation de facto, he cannot object to defendant’s testimony as to the strict corporate character of the company.
Eight to Act as Corporation.—An inquiry as to the right of a company to act as a corporation, can only be had at the suit of the State on information by the Attorney-General.
Void Patent.—If a patent for land shows upon its face that it is void, it may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, by any party interested in disputing its validity.
Patent Void upon its Pace.—If a patent shows that it was issued in the absence of legislation directing a sale of the property described, it is void upon its face.
A Patent Good in Part and Bad in Part.—If the law authorizes the sale of such land only as is under water at ordinary high tide, and belongs to the State by virtue of its sovereignty, and the patent conveys both swamp and overflowed lands, held by the State under the Arkansas Act, and lands owned by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, the patent is good in part and bad in part.
Salt Marsh Lands.—The term “salt marsh lands” in the legislation of this State, applies to a certain class of swamp and overflowed lands held by the State under the Arkansas Act.
Tide Lands. — The descriptive phrase “tide lands” in the legislation of this State, applies to land covered and uncovered by the ordinary tides, which the State owns by virtue of its sovereignty.
Party relying on Patent Good in Part.—If a patent is good in part and bad in part upon its face, and in its description of the land does not separate the good part from the bad, the party relying upon it must show himself within its good call.
By the Court, Shafter, J.: Action to recover damages for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s close. The defendants denied all the allegations of the complaint, and further defended on the ground that the locus in quo was the property of the Forth San Francisco Homestead and Railroad Association, a corporation formed under the laws of California, and that they, the defendants, performed the acts complained of as the agents and servants of said company. The appeal is by the plaintiff and is taken from the judgment and order denying a new trial.
First—For the purpose of proving the corporate existence of the company, the defendants offered in evidence an instru[361]ment purporting to be a certificate of incorporation of the North San Francisco Homestead and Railroad Association, signed and sealed by five persons only. The incorporation purported to be for twenty-five years. The plaintiff objected to the admissibility of the document, on the ground that five persons could not, by law, incorporate for homestead purposes, nor for a longer time than five years. The objection was overruled, and the plaintiff excepted.
There was no error in the ruling available to the plaintiff. The opening testimony of the plaintiff tended to prove that the company w'as a corporation defacto, and that evidence not only dispensed with the necessity of strict proof of the corporate character, but precluded the plaintiff from inquiring into or disputing it. Such inquiry could be had only at the suit of the State or on information by the Attorney-General. (Hittell, Art. 751.)
Second—To prove title in the corporation to the locus in quo, the defendants gave in evidence a special Act of the Legislature, entitled “ An Act to authorize the sale and conveyance to the North San Francisco Homestead and Railroad Association of certain overflowed lands in the City and County of San Francisco,” approved April 4, 1864 (Laws 1864, p. 482,) and then offered in evidence a patent of the State of California, dated June 23, 1864, purporting to be based upon the Act. Objection was taken by the plaintiff, on the ground that the patent “ was void on its face and professed to grant lands not authorized by the Act.” The patent was received and read to the jury, under the plaintiff’s objection, and “ subject to all objections as to its effect.” At a later stage in the trial the counsel of the plaintiff moved that the patent be stricken from the evidence, on the ground, “First—That it does not commence where the Act of April 4,1864, authorized it to commence; Second—That it embraced on its face lands not authorized to be granted by the statute; Third—That it not only takes land above the ordinary high water mark, but
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