Beaudry v. Valdez
Before: Sanderson, Shafter
Synopsis
Public Streets of Oakland.—The resolutions of the City Council of Oakland to improve the public streets and to accept bids to perform the work need not be approved by the Mayor.
Idem.—Macadamizing the streets and curbing the sidewalks are made by statute distinct kinds of improvement in Oakland, and the former does not include the latter.
Contract to improve Streets in Oakland.—A contract in Oakland to improve a public street is valid only for such improvements as are named in the resolution of intention to improve, passed by the Common Council. If such resolution declares only an intention to macadamize, the contract should not be let for both macadamizing and curbing the sidewalk.
Idem.—If the contract to improve a street in Oakland includes a kind of work not named in the resolution of intention, the contractor can recover for such work as is named in the resolution, if it can be separated from the other and estimated.
Duty of Mayor of Oakland.—The fact that the Mayor of Oakland, before his election, had become the assignee of a contract for the improvement of a street, as security for a debt due him by the contractor, does not affect the validity of the contract or of the assessment for the work, nor incapacitate him from countersigning tbe warrant for the collection of the assessment.
Idem.—The act of the Mayor of Oakland in countersigning a warrant for the collection of an assessment for street improvements is purely ministerial.
Appeal to Common Council of Oakland.—If there is any irregularity in the act of the Mayor of Oakland in countersigning a warrant for the collection of an assessment for a street improvement, such irregularity is waived by a failure to appeal from the act of the Mayor to the Common Council.
Idem.—If there is any irregularity in the demand for the amount of an assessment fur a street improvement in Oakland, or any defect in the assessment roll, the same is waived by a failure to appeal to the Common Council.
Street Assessment collectable in Gold Coin.—A tax due for an assessment for improving a street in Oakland, may be assessed upon a gold basis and collected in gold coin.
Judgment for Street Assessment in Oakland.—A personal judgment for the amount of an assessment for a street improvement in Oakland, should not be rendered against the defendant for a deficiency which may remain due after the enforcement of a lien on the lot.
Opinion — Sanderson
By the Court, Sanderson, J.: Action to recover an assessment levied for the improvement of Broadway street, in the City of Oakland.
I. The first point, to the effect that the City Council had not acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter at the time they ordered Broadway street to be improved, because the resolution of intention had not been presented to or approved by the Mayor of the city, is answered by the case of Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240. Upon this point the statute under which the City of Oakland works when improving her streets is identical with that under which the City of San Francisco works, and which was before us in Taylor v. Palmer. (Statutes of 1863-4, p. 333, Sec. 3; 1862, p. 392, Sec. 4.) In that case we held that resolutions of intention to improve streets, passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, need not be approved by the Mayor in order to become valid and vest the Board of Supervisors with jurisdiction to order the improvements.
II. The resolution of intention, and the resolution directing the improvement to be made, in terms, only provided for macadamizing the street. The contract for the improvement, and the assessment, both call for macadamizing the street and curbing the sidewalks. The contract price for macadamizing was twenty-two cents per square foot in legal tender notes, or eight and and a half cents in gold coin of the United States; and for curbing, fifty cents per lineal foot in legal tender notes, or twenty cents in gold coin of the United States. In view of these conditions it is claimed that the entire proceedings thereby became vitiated, and that no recovery can be had against the defendants.
[276]To meet the point testimony was admitted by the Court, on the part of the plaintiff, to show that the word “ macadamizing ” represented a certain process of street improvement which, ex vi termini, included curbing of the sidewalks.
This was error. The question whether the term “ macadamizing ” also includes “ curbing” is settled by the statute under which the parties having the matter in charge were working. The second section prescribes what street improvements the City Council shall have power to cause to be made. Each kind is separately named and described. “ Macadamizing ” is named as one, and “ curbing ” as another. Hence, whether the former might or might not, under other circumstances, include the latter, is not the question. Does it, within the meaning of the statute under which the parties were working is the question, and it is clear that it does not, for they are there mentioned as different and distinct kinds of street work, which circumstance shows that in the sense in which the former term is used in the statute it does not include the latter.
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