People v. Manahan

By the Court, Sawyer, J.: The proper number of grand jurors having been regularly summoned for the October term of the County Court of Sonoma County, when the Court was about to impanel a grand jury, the first thirteen who answered to their names were called to the'jury box, and, upon examination on the part of the defendant, three were ascertained to have formed and expressed opinions as to the defendant’s guilt, and on that ground were challenged by him. There were two other parties in custody, also awaiting the action of the grand jury. These latter parties having no good objection to any of those called, the said first thirteen who answered were impanelled and sworn, as the regular grand jury for the October term, and where charged by the Court to investigate all matters proper for their consideration, except the case of the defendant, but not to consider his case. Upon the challenge by the defendant of the three grand jurors who had formed opinions as to his guilt, the Court, instead of rejecting them and filling up the panel out of the remaining jurors who had appeared, made an order for the summoning of a special grand jury for the examination of the defendant’s case. To all of these proceedings the defendant excepted, and the action of the Court is assigned as error. It is claimed, on behalf of the defendant, [71]that he was entitled, as a matter of right, under the law, to the ten out of the thirteen found qualified, and to have the three who were disqualified set aside, and the panel completed out of those summoned, who had appeared. This cannot be so. The statute concerning grand and trial jurors is somewhat loosely drawn, but to give it such a construction would manifestly lead to absurd consequences. The rights of the defendant are no more sacred, and no more extensive, than the rights of the other two prisoners who were in actual custody at the time, or of twenty who might be in custody. If this claim of the defendant to have the first ten grand jurors who were qualified, and to have the panel filled up from the others summoned who were in attendance, must be allowed as a matter of right, then a claim on the part of the other two—or more, if there had been more prisoners—to the first thirteen who were qualified must also be allowed, and the other two prisoners were entitled to the very thirteen who were in-, fact impanelled, and who did constitute the regular grand jury for the term. In fact, upon the theory claimed, it might well be impossible to obtain a grand jury competent to act upon the case of more than one party in custody. The Court impanelled the first thirteen, so we cannot tell what the other two prisoners would have done had the three jurors been rejected; but if it was their right to except on that ground, and insist upon the invalidity of the indictment because of the rejection, it may safely and properly be assumed that the exception would have been taken. Thus, upon the theory maintained by the appellant, it was impossible for the Court to impanel a grand jury by which a valid indictment could have been found against all the defendants in custody at that term. Such a consequence would be absurd. But there is no necessity for such a construction. There was a lawful grand jury impanelled in the regular way for all the cases requiring examination at that term except the defendant’s. His case was the exception, and therefore the special one, and the Court in the exercise of its discretion under the circumstances, treated it as such, and ordered a special grand jury.