People v. Jim Ti

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1867Published

Before: Sawyer

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Holding. The court held that an objection to the sufficiency of an indictment's description must be raised by demurrer, that a confession made after the expiration of prior inducements is voluntary, and that a defendant's name may be corrected during arraignment.

Issues

Whether an objection to the particularity of an indictment's description is waived if not raised by demurrer.
Whether a confession made after the failure of prior inducements is voluntary and admissible.
Whether the substitution of a defendant's name on the record during arraignment is procedurally valid.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The objection to the sufficiency of the description-was not taken in the mode prescribed, and came too late.”

“Only voluntary confessions of the prisoner are admissible in evidence against him. At the time the declarations admitted in evidence were made, there was no threat or promise made.”

“The record shows that on arraignment the prisoner was asked if the name in the indictment was his true name; that he stated his name to be Jim Ti; that his name was substituted in the record”

Synopsis

Indictment por Larceny.—If an indictment for stealing money fails to describe the money with sufficient particularity, the objection should he taken by demurrer, and if not so taken is waived.

Larceny from Servant.—If property is stolen while an employé of the owner has charge of it, and another person is charged with the larceny, the prosecution are not bound, on his trial, to call as a witness such employe.

Confession of Crime.—Confessions which are entirely voluntary when made, are admissible in evidence,‘even if, on a prior occasion, some promise of favor not acted upon, and which had ceased to be operative, had been made to induce the accused to confess.

Confessions in Evidence.—The question as to the admissibility of confessions is one for the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to be guided by the circumstances of each particular case.

Money Stolen.—On a trial for a larceny of gold and silver coin, the identity of the money stolen with that found on the defendant is a question of fact for the jury.

Name in Indictment.—If a defendant is indicted by a wrong name, and so states when asked, and gives his true name, the true name may be substituted, and subsequent proceedings had in the true name.

By the Court, Sawyer, J.: The objection to the indictment, that the money stolen is not described with sufficient particularity, should have been taken by demurrer. The objection to the sufficiency of the description-was not taken in the mode prescribed, and came too late. (People v. Shotwell, 27 Cal. 401; People v. Garnett, 29 Cal. 626.) The facts charged are sufficient to constitute an offense.

The evidence presented by the people was sufficient to sustain the verdict—to prove the taking as well as the felonious intent—and it is no objection that the people did not call the barkeeper, either on the ground that his testimony might have made the case stronger, or weaker. If the defendant supposed the case of the people might have been weakened by [63]the testimony of. the barkeeper, he was himself at liberty to call him.

Before the money was found, the owner charged the defendant with the larceny, and told him if he would return the money, or tell him where it was, he would let him go, but if he would not he would have him put in jail. Defendant denied any knowledge of the theft, and said the owner could put him in jail, or cut his throat, but that he could not tell him anything about it. He was arrested and committed to jail. Subsequently, after the money had been found secreted at defendant’s residence, and defendant’s wife had also been arrested and committed to jail, and while he was in jail, the prisoner was again asked by the owner if he took the money, and he answered that “he did, and was a fool to do so.” On his examination before the magistrate, he also stated that he “ took the money and was a fool for doing so, but that he intended to replace it.” These declarations were admitted in evidence under objection, on the ground that some benefit had been held out to him if he would confess before the money was found, and before he had been arrested. Undoubtedly, confessions induced by hope, or fear, based upon promises or threats, must be excluded. Only voluntary confessions of the prisoner are admissible in evidence against him. At the time the declarations admitted in evidence were made, there was no threat or promise made. There was nothing at all said by way of inducement, after the conversation before mentioned which was had before the arrest, and before the money had been found. The promise, then, was, if the prisoner would return the money, or tell where it could be found, he would be allowed to go, but if he did not, he would be sent to jail. The promise related to the finding and restoring of the money which the owner was desirous of securing. He refused to tell anything about it, was arrested and committed to jail, and the money subsequently found secreted on the premises occupied by the prisoner. The whole object of the promise, and the conditions upon which it had been made, had been accomplished without defendant’s aid; the threatened consequence

People v. Jim Ti

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