Holman v. Taylor
Before: Rhodes
Synopsis
Jurisdiction op District Courts.—The District Courts have jurisdiction of actions to recover one half the value of a partition fence, although the amount sought to be recovered is less than three hundred dollars. Such actions involve the title of the parties to their respective lands.
Idem.—Section six of Article VI of the Constitution gives the District Courts jurisdiction of all actions in which the title or possession of real property is an issuable fact in the case, upon which the plaintiff relies for a recovery, or the defendant for a defense. *It is not necessary that the title or possession be put in issue, but one or the other must be an issuable fact necessary to be averred in the pleadings.
Idem.—District Courts have jurisdiction of all actions to recover damages for trespass upon lands, regardless of the amount of damages claimed.
By the Court, Rhodes, J.: The complaint, which was filed in the District Court, alleges that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of a certain tract of land, inclosed by a fence erected by him on the boundary line of the land; that the defendant is the owner of an adjoining tract, on which he has made an inclosure, of which the plaintiff’s fence constitutes one part, serving as a partition fence between the two tracts; that one half of the partition fence is of the value of two hundred dollars, and that the defendant has not paid said sum, or any part thereof, etc. The defendant’s demurrer on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action being overruled, he answered, and judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant has sued out a writ of certiorari.
The only point presented in support of the writ is that, under section six, Article VI, of the Constitution, the Court has no jurisdiction of the action. The language of the section applicable to the case is: “ The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction * * * in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property.” * * * This provision was incorporated into the Constitution by the amendments adopted in 1862, there being no similar or analogous provision in the Constitution before that time.' This language is not employed in the Constitution of any other State in describing the subject matter of jurisdiction conferred on the Courts, and consequently no aid in the interpretation of the peculiar language of ours can be derived from the construction given to the provisions of other Constitutions.
It is difficult to define with precision the'word “involve” as it is employed in that section. Its primary signification is [340]to “ roll up or envelop,” and it also means “ to comprise, to contain, to include by rational or logical construction,” but none of these express the precise idea, and its exact synonym may not be found in a single word. The idea intended to be embodied in the phrase “ cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property ” may be expressed by the paraphrase : “ cases at law in which the title or possession of real property is a material fact in the casé!, upon which the plaintiff relies for a recovery or the defendant for a defense.” When the title or claim of title, the possession or right of possession, of real property, or any right growing out of or dependent upon either, is alleged in the pleadings as an issuable fact, the case is within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
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