Caldwell v. Center

By the Court, Rhodes, J.: The cause was submitted to the jury both upon the theory of title under the Van Hess Ordinance and prior possession, and the verdict for the plaintiff being general, it is impossible to determine from the record upon which theory it was rendered ; but admitting that the evidence, which we think was clearly insufficient to establish title in the plaintiff under the Van Hess Ordinance, tended to show such prior possession in Foley, that the verdict would not be disturbed on the ground [542]that the evidence was insufficient on that point, it becomes necessary to pass upon some of the other questions of the case.

Did the plaintiff acquire Foley’s title ? One of the links in the chain of title under which the plaintiff claims, is a deed from Stevens and Abell to Lyons and Sturtevant of the parcel of land “ known as Lot Number One in the subdivision of the tract of land lying on the new county road, and known as Folpy’s tract, the map of which is duly recorded in the Recor* der’s office of the County of San Francisco, reference to which is herein made,” the deed being admitted only as the deed of Stevens.

Description of land in deed.

The parties to a deed, instead of setting out in full the metes and bounds or other complete designation of the tract intended to be conveyed, may describe it, in whole or in part, by reference to some instrument, as a deed, map, etc., which contains or furnishes such a description of the land that it, when read in connection with the deed, will completely identify the land. An instance of this manner of describing the premises is found in Hicks v. Coleman, 25 Cal. 122. The deed and the instrument therein referred to, when taken together, must be as certain in respect to the description of the premises, as a deed containing no direct reference to another document. It is unnecessary to say whether the instrument referred to in the deed must- be produced in evidence, when the deed itself contains a sufficient description of the premises; but when such is not the case the party claiming under the deed is under the same rule to produce the instrument referred to in the deed, as to produce the deed itself.

The deed of Stevens and Abell to Lyons and Sturtevant is not sufficient in the description of the premises conveyed, to designate and attach itself to any particular tract of land without the aid of further evidence. Admitting that the exterior lines of the Foley tract were as claimed by the plaintiff, evidence of some kind was requisite to show where Lot Number One was located. The only evidence introduced by