Ewald v. Lyons (1866) · DecisionDepot

Ewald v. Lyons

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1866Published

Before: Rhodes

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Holding. The court held that a party who voluntarily executes a written lease with full knowledge of its terms cannot subsequently seek to rescind that contract in favor of a prior inconsistent parol agreement, nor can they reform the lease absent evidence of mistake, fraud, or duress.

Issues

Whether a party may specifically enforce a prior parol agreement after voluntarily executing a written contract with different terms.
Whether a written lease may be reformed based on allegations of economic pressure or disadvantageous terms.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the Court must leave them, unless it can be shown that the Court has authority which has never been attributed to it, to substitute an agreement differing in its terms, for the one the parties have freely and voluntarily executed.”

Synopsis

Enforcement of Parol Contract in Equity.—If the lessee and lessor enter into a parol agreement with regard to a new lease of the premises the lessee is occupying, and the amount of rent to be paid by the lessee, and improvements made by him and to be made on the premises, and afterwards the lessee executes a lease in writing relating to the same subject matter, containing terms varying from the parol agreement, a Court of equity will not rescind the written lease and enforce the parol contract, nor, unless upon some equitable ground, as mistake, or fraud, will it reform the written lease to make it correspond with the parol contract.

Same.—A Court of equity will not enforce a parol contract, if, after the same is made, the parties voluntarily enter into a written contract differing in terms from the parol agreement, nor will it substitute the parol contract for the written one.

By the Court, Rhodes, J. This shit was brought for the purpose of specifically enforcing a parol contract in relation to the leasing of certain premises, and of reforming a lease of the premises that was executed between the defendant on the one part, and the plaintiff and one Ciprico on the other part, and as incidental to such relief to have an account taken between the plaintiff and defendant in respect to certain repairs on the leased premises made by [553]the defendant, and certain sums alleged to have been paid as rent in excess of the rate provided for in the parol contract. The defendant filed a general demurrer, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and specified several distinct causes, and the demurrer having been sustained, the plaintiff appealed.

The demurrer is well taken as to the first three causes specified, if the claim on the account of the repairs made before the execution of the lease to the plaintiff and Ciprico, and those made after the execution of that lease, and the claim for the excess of rent paid, are separate causes of action; for as to the first repairs it is not alleged that the defendant either expressly or impliedly promised to- pay for the expenses of such, repairs; and’ as to the second repairs the lease provides that the lessees shall make the repairs at their own expense; and the sum of fifty dollars per month, which is alleged was in excess of the proper rent, formed a part of the four hundred dollars per month covenanted in the lease to be paid by them.

But the plaintiff, as we understand counsel, not controverting this view, holds that they are not separate causes of action, but are merely allegations of matters of fact, showing a performance ón his part of the parol agreement entered into between the parties, and which he asks may be ordered to be specifically performed by the defendant, by the execution of a new lease, and by a reformation of the present one. His right to such relief may be tested by the general demurrer.

Specific performance of farol contract.

In respect to the claim for a specific performance, the case, briefly stated, is this: The plaintiff being about to purchase an existing lease, states to the agent of the defendant—the landlord—that he proposes to make certain repairs on the premises, “ and he is assured by said agent” that if he shall purchase the lease and make the proposed repairs, the defendant will renew the lease, or execute a new lease upon similar

Ewald v. Lyons

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