People v. Hughes

By the Court, Sanderson, C. J. The questions arising under the first, second and third bills of exceptions, and the exceptions to the refusal and giving of instructions to the jury, so far as they are discussed by counsel, are substantially the same, and we shall consider them together.

I. The defendant was indicted for arson in the second degree, under Article 1,917, Wood’s Digest, p. 336, committed by burning a certain building belonging to him, which building was at the time insured against loss or damage by fire by a duly incorporated company, known by the name of the Hartford Insurance Company, with intent to defraud said company. At the trial it was shown by the prosecution that the building was insured in the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, upon the request of the defendant, by one Charles Belding, acting as agent of the company at Stockton, in this State, and that said Belding delivered the policy to the defendant, and that the same was accepted by him. But no proof was offered of the due incorporation of the insurance company or of their compliance with the statutes of this State in order to entitle them to transact business here.

The record does not contain the evidence so far as the present branch of it is concerned, but merely bills of exception and the instructions of the Court. As we understand the record, the only question presented by this branch of it is as to whether it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the existence of the insurance company as a corporation by the production of its charter, and showing a compliance on its part with the law of this State, and that the contract of insurance was made by the duly and legally appointed officers or agents of the corporation, or whether it was sufficient to show a corporation de facto, and that the agents by whom the con[260]tract of insurance was made were the agents de facto of the corporation.

It is true that counsel for the defendant seem to claim in their brief that the recital of facts, in their bills of exception, as proved and not proved, show that even the de facto existence of the corporation was not proved, nor the execution of the policy by any de facto officers or agents of such corporation., If this were so, there would be an end of the case, for the want of any evidence whatever upon the question of insurance. But we do not so read the bills of exception or the instructions of the Court. Belding testified that he was acting as the agent of the corporation, and effected the insurance and delivered the policy which was received by the defendant, and was still in his possession, or which is the same thing, in the possession of his attorney. Thus much appears from the recitals contained in the bills of exception. From those facts the jury might well find-the de facto existence of the corporation, and the execution and delivery of the policy of insurance by its de facto agents.