Spencer v. Prindle (1865) · DecisionDepot

Spencer v. Prindle

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Apr 15, 1865Published

Before: Sawyer

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Holding. The court held that in a suit for the reasonable value of services where no specific currency was stipulated, the jury may consider testimony regarding the value of services in different forms of legal tender, as the debtor retains the option to pay in the currency of their choice. Consequently, the defendant was not prejudiced by an instruction allowing the jury to consider such testimony.

Issues

Whether a jury may consider testimony regarding the value of services in different forms of legal tender when no specific currency was stipulated in the contract.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard the difference in value between different forms of legal tender.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The debtor may pay whichever he chooses—and when there is any considerable difference in the value, it may safely be presumed that he will pay in that which will be most conducive to his interest”

Synopsis

Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.

Defendant appealed from the judgment and from the order denying a new trial.

The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Opinion — Sawyer

By the Court,

Sawyer, J. The plaintiffs—being attorneys at law—sued Prindle for professional services. The services were admitted on the trial, ¡j and the only issue was as to their value. William H. Patterson, an attorney, having been asked the general question, as to the reasonable value of the services of plaintiffs, without any reference in the question to any particular kind of money to be taken as the standard of valué, answered, “that the ser[277]vices were worth one thousand dollars in greenbacks, or five hundred dollars in coin.” The other witnesses all made similar answers to similar questions. No objection being taken in any form to any portion of the testimony.

On this testimony the defendant asked the Court to give to the jury the following instruction :

“The jury, in assessing the damages, are not at liberty to take into consideration the difference in value of the currency of the country, but will find a verdict without reference thereto.”

The Court refused to give the instruction, as asked, but did give it with the following addition, “ except so far as testified to by witnesses and admittted to go to you as testimony in the case.” Defendant excepted to the refusal and modification. A verdict was returned in favor of plaintifi* for the sum of eight hundred and eighty-nine dollars and twenty-five cents, the amount claimed in the complaint. No particular kind of money was specified in the verdict, or judgment. The ruling of the Court upon the foregoing charge is the error relied on, on the motion for new trial, and on appeal.

The term, “greenback,” as use'd in the testimony, is of course, intended to designate treasury notes of the United States, made by Act of Congress a legal tender in payment of debts; and the term, “coin,”-to signify the coin of the United States, also made a legal tender. The plaintiffs instruction assumes, that, in legal contemplation, a dollar in one of these kinds of money is equivalent to a dollar in the other—that a dollar in gold is of no more value than a dollar in “greenbacks,” and a dollar in “greenbacks” of no less value than a dollar in gold. Concedipg this to be so, the most that the defendant can complain of is, that the jury found the value of the services in greenbacks. But this value is, upon the hypothesis assumed, equal to the same number of dollars in gold. The defendants, therefore, could not have been injured.

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But in a contract for goods sold, or for services performed, without any stipulated price, a promise is implied to pay what they are reasonably worth. When this question comes to be litigated, the question is, not whether a dollar in greenbacks is worth more or less than a dollar in gold, but what are the goods, or services worth ? The dollar is to be the unit of [279]value, but the Court can no more say that the value of a gold dollar in the commercial world shall be taken as the standard of value, than that the value of a “greenback” dollar shall be the standard. The Court cannot say in which kind the payment shall be made—that is left to the option of the debtor; and for the same reason, it cannot say that the money of the greater value shall be taken as the measure of value. The debtor may pay whichever he chooses—and when there is any considerable difference in the value, it may safely be presumed that he will pay in that which will be most conducive to his interest; and that would of course be the kind which is of the least value. If he does not do so, it is simply because he does not choose to do it. He has the option if he chooses to exercise it. “ Greenbacks ” are lawful money—they are a legal tender for all debts—and are therefore necessarily a legal standard for the measurement of values—not of other lawful money, but of all commodities bought and sold, services rendered, etc. In all States of the Union—unless California is an exception—they actually are the standard by which values are estimated in legal investigations, as well as in business transactions. There must be some standard by which values must be determined. And we see no reason, why that kind of money may not be taken, which the law makes a standard, and which must be accepted in satisfaction of the judgment in case it should be tendered by the judgment debtor, whether the creditor is willing or not. If paid in that kind of money, the debtor pays no more than he ought—no more than the actual.value of the property purchased, measured by a lawful standard; and if he does not so pay it, he can blame no one but himself. In this case, had the instruction been given as asked, there would have been, in view of the evidence, no standard of value by which the jury could have been guided. For the testimony introduced without objection—as it necessarily, either tacitly or avowedly, must have done—all referred the value of the, services either to coin or “ greenbacks,” and there would have been at least no greater propriety in taking coin as the measure than greenbacks. The instruction, as [280]modified and given, -does not submit any very distinct proposition to the jury; but the jurors were substantially told that they were to determine the value of the services upon the evidence before them. The instruction, if it meant anything, amounted to this. The worst view the jury could have taken for defendant, under the instruction, was to take “greenbacks ” as the standard of value; and this, as we have seen, is a recognized legal standard. Admitting that they did so, the defendant could at once have paid the judgment in “ greenbacks ”— the standard by which the value was measured—and by so doing he would have paid no more than the actual value of the services. He was therefore not injured by the instruction as modified, or by the refusal of the instruction as asked.

Spencer v. Prindle

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Synopsis

Opinion — Sawyer

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