Caulfield v. Stevens

[119]By the Court,

Sanderson, C. J. The only question presented for our consideration relates to the constitutionality of the Act under which this suit was commenced, it being claimed upon the one hand, and denied upon the other, that it conflicts with the eighth and ninth sections of Article VI of the Constitution as amended in 1862.

The eighth section defines the jurisdiction of the County Courts, and among other things declares that they “ shall have original jurisdiction of actions of forcible entry and detainer.” The ninth section declares that “ the Legislature shall determine the number of Justices of the Peace to be elected in each city and township of the State, and fix by law their powers, duties and responsibilities; provided such powers shall not in any case trench upon the jurisdiction of the several Courts of record. The Supreme Court, the District Courts, County Courts, the Probate Courts, and such other Courts as the Legislature shall prescribe, shall be Courts of record.”

It is insisted on the part of the appellant that the words “ forcible entry and detainer ” contained in the eighth section embrace only cases of forcible entry into lands and tenements, and a forcible detainer after peaceable entry, and do not include cases like the present of unlawful holding over of lands, tenements, and other possessions after the termination of the demise or after a failure to pay rent according to the terms of the lease. This would doubtless be so if the reading of those words is to be confined to. the language of strict definition; but we think the reading should give as broad a signification to the words in question as they have received in the nomenclature of modern legislation .and in common professional parlance. Under the general head of “ forcible entry and detainer,” nearly every one if not all the States of the American Union have legislated, in the same Act, not only upon the subject of forcible entry and forcible detainer, but also upon the subject of unlawful detainer, thus treating all three as one general subject, sufficiently described by the words in question. If technical exactness is to be observed, a [120]more full and complete statement of the subject of such legislation would find expression in the words “ forcible entry and forcible and unlawful detainer.” Yet this exactness of designation has not been observed in the' legislation of the country nor in its legal parlance. We speak of such legislation.as the Forcible Entry and Detainer Acts. We speak in general terms of this or that action as being brought under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, regardless of the minor fact whether it be for a forcible entry or a forcible detainer, or an unlawful detainer, thus using the words in a generic sense and as comprehending all three.