People v. Yslas

By the Court, Sanderson, C. J. The defendant was indicted for an assault with intent to commit murder, tried and convicted as charged.

At the trial the defense proposed to impeach the testimony of the prosecutrix by proving her to be of a notoriously bad character fbr chastity. The testimony was rejected by the Court, and we are asked to reverse the judgment upon the [633]ground that the decision of the Court in that respect was erroneous.

That the ruling of the Court is sustained by the great mass of authority is not disputed by counsel for appellant; but it is insisted, notwithstanding, that the better reason6is opposed to it. We do not deem it necessary to enter into a discussion as to what the law ought to be upon this subject. There is much force in the argument made in support of the theory that the inquiry into the character of a witness, for the purpose of impeaching his testimony, ought not to be restricted to his reputation for truth and veracity; but the rule is too well settled the other way for us to disturb it. If it is thought that the ends of justice would be subserved by changing the rule so as to make the entire moral character of the witness in the estimation of society the subject of inquiry, let the change be made by the Legislature, and not the judiciary.

The instructions asked for on the part of the defendant were properly refused. The first and second seem to be founded upon the idea that there is a substantial difference between an assault at common law and an assault as defined in our statute. In our judgment no such distinction exists. The common law definition of an assault is substantially the same as that found in the statute. (1 Russell-on Qrimes, 748; 1 Wharton, Section 1,241.] The vice in the two instructions under consideration is found in the idea which they countenance that there may be an intermediate point between the commencement and the end of an assault where if the assailant is interrupted either by the escape of the party assailed or the interference of bystanders, the offense is thereby made incomplete.

In order to constitute an assault there must be something more than a mere menace. There must be violence begun to be executed. But where there is a clear intent to commit violence accompanied by acts which if not interrupted will be followed by personal injury, the violence is commenced and the assault is complete. Thus riding after the prosecutor so as to compel him to run into a garden for shelter, to avoid