Agnew v. Costa
Before: Shaeter, Shatter
Synopsis
Liability op Steamboat as a Common Carrier. — In an action against a steamboat, as a common carrier, for the loss of a horse by the explosion of the boiler, alleged by the plaintiff to have been caused by racing with a rival steamer, evidence on the part of the defense to show the good condition of the boiler is irrelevant, both on the question of liability and of damages.
Same.—In such case, evidence on the part of the defense that the engine and boilers were strong, and that extraordinary care was used by the officers and crew of the steamer in their management while racing, is also irrelevant.
Liability op Common Carrier.—The presumption of the law is against a common carrier, except it be made to appear that the injury complained of could not have happened by the intervention of human means.
Opinion — Shatter
■By the Court, Shatter, J. This action was brought to recover damages for the loss of a stallion, by means of the negligence of the defendant as a common carrier between the cities of San Francisco and Oakland.
The plaintiff- introduced evidence tending to • prove that on the 3d day of April, 1859, he embarked the stallion on the “ Contra Costa,” at San Francisco, to be carried for him to the City of Oakland. That the horse was put by the captain of the boat opposite the boiler in the place where horses were usually stationed. That the boiler of the steamer exploded on the passage, and that the horse was so far injured by the explosion that he died on the same day. That the Contra Costa was at the time racing with a rival steamer running between the same termini; that there was betting among the passen[429]gers of the Contra Costa, which betting was encouraged by the assurances and conduct of the engineer.
The defendant offered in evidence the deposition of George W. Coffee, “ for the purpose solely of showing the condition of the boilers of the steamer.” The plaintiff objected to the evidence as incompetent and irrelevant, and the Court sustained the objection. The appellant claims that this ruling was erroneous.
Where the cause of the damage for which recompense is sought is unconnected, as was the case here, with the conduct or propensities of the animal undertaken to be carried, the carrier is subjected to the ordinary responsibilities connected with his vocation. (Palmer v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 4 Mees. and Wels. 749; Clarke v. The Rochester and Syracuse Railroad Company, 14 N. Y. 574.) In the case at bar, the boilers were either sufficient or insufficient. If they were insufficient, proof of the fact could have been of no service to the defendant, of course ; and if sufficient, the proper deduction from the fact would be, not that the explosion resulted from the act of God, but from some fault in the management—the very cause to which it was attributed in the theory of the plaintiff’s case. The defendant was an insurer against all injury not resulting from the act of God or the public enemies, or from the conduct of the animal; and it follows that the good condition of the boilers had as little to do with the question of liability and with the question of damages also, as the condition of the rudder or the general staunchness of the ship, the misconduct charged being assumed or given.
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