People v. Hodges

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1865Published

Before: Shafter

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Holding. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant because the acts constituting his offense were committed in a different county than the murder, and under the Criminal Practice Act, jurisdiction for an accessory lies in the county where the accessory's acts occurred.

Issues

Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to try the defendant for murder when his acts were committed in a different county than the principal offense.
Whether the failure to move in arrest of judgment precludes the defendant from challenging the court's jurisdiction on appeal.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“In the case of an accessory before or after the fact in the commission of a public offense, the jurisdiction shall be in that county where the offense of the accessory was committed, notwithstanding the principal offense was committed in another county.”

“As it is apparent on the face of the record that the whole of the proceedings were coram non judice, the judgment cannot be permitted to stand, even though the motion in arrest was not, in terms, based upon that objection.”

Synopsis

Place of Trial of Accessory.—An accessory before or after the fact in the commission of a public offense must be indicted and tried in that county where the offense of the accessory was committed, notwithstanding the principal offense was committed in another county.

Want of Jurisdiction appearing on Trial.—When it becomes manifest in the course of the trial of a person indicted as an accessory, that the offense of the accessory was committed in another county than that where the indictment was found, the Court should, on its own motion, discharge the jury and commit the accused to await a warrant from the proper county.

Arrest of Judgment in case of Accessory.—If the evidence shows that the offense of the accessory was not committed in the county where the indictment was found, the Court should arrest the judgment without a motion to that effect being made.

Distinction between Accessory and Principal. — A person who incites, counsels, hires, or commands another to commit a crime, but is not within such convenient distance as to be able to come to the immediate assistance of his associates, if required, or to watch to prevent surprise, is an accessory, and not a principal in the second degree.

By the Court, Shafter, J. Thomas B. Pool was indicted, jointly with three others, by the Grand Jury of the County of El'Dorado, for the murder of Joseph M. Staples, which murder was alleged to have been committed in said county, July 1, 1864; and it was further charged in the indictment that Hodges, the appellant, within said county, “incited, counselled, hired and commanded” the said Pool and others to commit the said murder.

The appellant, on a separate trial, was found guilty by the jury of murder in the second degree, and he was thereupon sentenced by the Court to confinement in the State Prison for the period of twenty years.

[341]There is only one question in the case necessary to be considered.

It appeared from all the testimony introduced at the trial, that the acts wherewith Hodges stood charged, were performed by him in the County of Santa Clara, over two hundred miles distant from the scene of the murder; and on that ground, it is now insisted for the appellant that the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, in which the trial and conviction were had, had no jurisdiction of the offense charged against him.

We consider the obj ection to be well taken. Section ninety-three of the Criminal Practice Act is as follows: “ In the case of an accessory before or after the fact in the commission of a public offense, the jurisdiction shall be in that county where the offense of the accessory was committed, notwithstanding the principal offense was committed in another county.” By section two hundred and fifty-five, all persons connected in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and assist in its commission, though not present, are to be indicted, tried, and punished, as principals. To that extent “all distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree,” is expressly abolished by the section.

There is no conflict between these sections. The latter (Section 255) requires that an accessory should be indicted, tried and punished in the same manner as principals ; and section ninety-three fixes the place at or in which those events are to transpire.

Though the common law distinction between principal and accessory is in the main obliterated, yet it is retained for the purposes of venue. Sections eleven and twelve of the Act entitled “ Crimes and punishments,” define the term “ accessory.” Section two hundred and fifty-five of the Criminal Practice Act relates to the frame of the indictment against an accessory, the method of trial, and the measure of punishment; and section ninety-three determines the forum having juris

People v. Hodges

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