Clarke v. Huber

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1864Published

Before: Shafter

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that an equitable defense, such as an estoppel in pais, must be specially pleaded in the answer in an action of ejectment, and that the failure to do so results in a waiver of that defense.

Issues

Whether the defendant's evidence regarding an equitable estoppel was properly excluded due to the failure to plead it in the answer.
Whether the Statute of Limitations barred the plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property.
Whether the defendant's title deeds included the premises in controversy.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the decisions of this and of the late Supreme Court require that in actions at common law all equitable defenses should be specially stated in the answer. If they are not so stated they are waived for all the purposes of the action.”

“The defense which the appellant offered to prove was not only an equitable defense, but was one over which the jurisdiction in equity was exclusive.”

Synopsis

Statute of Limitations.—The period of limitation in this State, to bar a right of entry upon real estate, commenees to run from the 22d of April, 1855.

Estoppel at Common Law.—At common law a purely equitable estoppel, or purely equitable title, could not be entertained, even if it were represented upon the record.

Estoppels in Pais must be Pleaded.—Under our system of practice equitable estoppels and defenses can be entertained in actions at law, but they must be specially stated in the answer.

Evidence of Estoppel.—If an equitable estoppel, relied on in an action of ejectment, is not specially set up in the answer, evidence to sustain it should be rejected.

Argument in Supreme Court.—The respondent on an appeal to the Supreme Court is at liberty to suggest any ground that he may choose, to show that the ruling of the Court below was right, whether the grounds suggested were advanced in the discussion before the Court below or not, while the appellant is confined to the objections urged in the Court below.

By the Court, Shafter, J. This was an action of ejectment brought to recover the possession of a portion of the Rancho Santa Rita, situated in the County of Santa Clara.

In addition to the usual allegations in ejectment, it is averred in the complaint that “ the plaintiff claims the premises and the possession thereof, under title derived from the Mexican Government, and that said title was, viz: on the first Monday in December, eighteen hundred and fifty-nine, finally confirmed by the legally constituted authorities of the United States, viz: the Supreme Court thereof.”

The answer contains a general denial; a special plea of title in Henry A. Huber, containing an averment that the defendant is in possession of the premises by leave and license of. the said Henry A. Huber; and a further plea of the Statute of Limitations. In this last plea the defendant impliedly admits that a Mexican grant embracing the property was confirmed by the Court, and at the date named in the complaint, but denies the allegation that the plaintiff claims the premises, or any part thereof, by virtue of such grant.

[5951]. As to the title of Henry A. Huber, which the defendant justifies.

It was admitted at the trial that the lands described in the complaint were part of the Rancho Santa Rita, granted by the Mexican nation to José Pena; that the said grant had been finally confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in December, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, to José Teodoro Robles and Secundino Robles, grantees of said José Pena.

It further appeared that José Teodoro Robles, one of the tenants in common, on the 2d of April, 1858, conveyed an undivided moiety of said rancho to Antonio Larrain, who conveyed the same to Vallejo, who conveyed to the plaintiff on the 25th of March, 1859. It was admitted that the plaintiff and defendant both claimed under the aforesaid grant.

It appeared from evidence introduced by defendant that José Teodoro Robles, having first procured from Secundino Robles a conveyance of all his interest in the said rancho, conveyed (as we shall for the purposes of the present investigation assume) three hundred and twenty acres of the rancho to Louis and Wilhelmina Koch, on the 8th day of February, 1853, and that the said grantees conveyed the same to the said Henry A. Huber on the 23d day of September, 1853. It further appeared that the defendant was in possession of the lands described in the complaint by the license alleged in the answer.

Clarke v. Huber

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief