Trinity County v. McCammon
Before: Shafter
Synopsis
Supervisor—Term op.—One who has held the office of Supervisor is, .after the expiration of his term, and the election and qualification of his successor, no longer an officer, either cZe jure or cZe facto, but if he attempts to act as such, is a mere naked usurper.
Proper Dependants in Action to enjoin Supervisors.—Where a Board of Supervisors consists of three members, at least two of them should be made defendants, in an action brought to enjoin the Board from purchasing property for the use of the county.
Complaint in Action to enjoin Supervisors.—In such case, if the complaint does not aver that at least two members of the Board are about to make an order for the purchase, and for a warrant to be drawn on the Treasury for payment, it does not state facts sufficient to authorize an injunction to be granted.
County Warrants—When Void.—A warrant drawn by the Auditor on the Treasurer of a county without having been ordered by a majority of the Board of Supervisors, is void; and should the Treasurer pay such warrant he would be liable to the county on his official bond.
Opinion op Court applies to Pacts in Record.—When an appeal is taken from an order granting a preliminary injunction, and the order is reversed, the opinion of the Court will not apply to any new state of facts which may appear in the record, or an appeal from the final judgment.
By the Court, Shafter, J. This is an appeal from an order refusing to dissolve an injunction.
The injunction was improperly granted, and therefore the Court erred in overruling the motion to dissolve. The difficulty with the case made in the complaint is, that it has not too little, but too much strength.
Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, McCammon is Supervisor, neither de jure nor de facto; on the contrary, he bears no other character than -chat of a naked usurper. As to Quine, the complaint charges that he is a member of the Board, and the affidavits used in support of the motion to dissolve do not deny the averment. As to Edgcomb, he is not represented in the complaint as having, or as pretending to have, any official character whatever, but he is brought in simply as the owner of a building which he is seeking to sell to the county for a Court-house.
As to defendant Mussel*, the complaint charges that he is County Treasurer of Trinity County, and as such has in his possession the money belonging to the “ Court-house Fund.”
It is further stated that, at the filing of the complaint, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Trinity was in fact composed of the defendant Quine, and A. Gr. Price and Henry Martin, neither of whom is made a party.
The bill, then, was filed for the purpose of restraining Edgcomb from selling his bailing to the County of Trinity, and to restrain one Supervisor only, out of three, from making the purchase.
To guard against the purchase effectually, the action should have been brought against two members of the Board at the least. The co-operation of McCammon with Quine in the matter of the threatened purchase, does not vary the matter, for McCammon was a mere pretender by averment, and in view of the Act of March 31, 1857, (Wood’s Dig. 697,) we consider that he was a pretender in fact.
At the expiration of the time for which McCammon was [120]elected to the office of Supervisor, his right ended; and further, he was stripped of all color of right thereafter by the act and operation of a public law. The hnpotency of Quine to buy could not be aided by the alleged alliance between him and McCammon.
But if the charges were made against those who constitute the Board of Supervisors, in an action brought for the purpose of restraining them frpm making the purchase in question, there is great doubt whether the action could be maintained. Boards of Supervisors under the general law (Wood’s Dig. 694, sec. 9) have no power to purchase real property on behalf of the counties they represent, except where the value of the property has been previously estimated by three disinterested persons appointed for that purpose by the County Judge. This important check has not been removed by the Act of 1863, (Stats, p. 55,) authorizing the Board of Supervisors of Trinity County to levy .a tax for a county “ Building Fund.” It is true that in that case three persons were appointed by the County Judge to estimate the value of the building in question; but instead of reporting an estimate of value they reported that the building was in their judgment wholly' “ unsuitable for a Court-house.” Under such circumstances the members of the Board of Supervisors would themselves be as powerless to make the purchase as any or all of the present defendants.
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