Uridias v. Morrell
Before: Shafter
Synopsis
Tenant at Sufferance.—By the common law, a tenant who holds over after the expiration of his lease, was regarded as a tenant at sufferance; but this estate was destroyed whenever the true owner made an actual entry on the lands and ousted the tenant.
Tenant Holding Over.—Section thirteen of the Act concerning forcible entry and detainer, as amended by the third section of the Act of 1862, makes no change in the common law except in the fact that it dispenses with a formal entry, and substitutes therefor a written demand.
Same—Unlawful Detainer.—A complaint in an action based upon said section, where eight months had expired after the expiration of the lease, which does not aver that the holding over on the part of the defendant was wrongful, nor that a surrender of the possession was demanded and refused within the year ensuing the lease, does not state $acts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Same—Evidence Extending Lease.—An agreement made by the landlord with the tenant, after the expiration of the lease, that the tenant shall have possession of the premises one year longer, paying therefor a stipulated rent, to be paid if the land is included in a certain survey, vests in the tenant the present right to possess the lands until the expiration of the agreement, and if pleaded, is admissible in evidence as a defense to an action for holding over brought before the expiration of the time specified in the agreement.
Pleading Inconsistent Defenses.—If inconsistent defenses are set up in an answer, the defect must be reached by motion to strike out or by demurrer •, and if no objection be taken to the answer on this ground, defendant may on the trial rely on any of these defenses.
By the Court, Shafter, J. This action is based upon the thirteenth section of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, as amended by the third section of the Act of 1862. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff demised the premises to the defendant for one year ensuing the first of October, 1860, at the yearly rent of two dollars per acre ,• that on or about the first of October, 1860, the defendant entered into possession of the premises under the lease, and that after the expiration of the term the defendant failed and refused to deliver the possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or to pay the rents therefor; and that when such delivery was demanded, in writing, on the third of June, 1862, the defendant neglected and refused to deliver. The complaint was filed July 16,1862.
The complaint was demurred to on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and thereafter the case was tried upon the issues of fact. The verdict of the jury was for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
I. It is claimed that the order overruling the demurrer was erroneous.
It is urged that there is no allegation in the complaint that the holding over on the part of the defendant was wrongful, [35]and that in the absence of such allegation it must be presumed that the holding over was under some new and substantive agreement, or at least by leave and license of the plaintiff.
When a tenant holds over after the expiration of his lease, he is regarded by the common law as a tenant at sufferance; but this estate may be destroyed whenever the true owner shall make an actual entry oh the lands and oust the tenant; for before entry he cannot maintain an action for trespass against the tenant by sufferance as he might against a stranger; and the reason is, because the tenant being in by lawful title, the law, which presumes no wrong in any man, will suppose him to continue upon a title equally lawful, unless the owner of the land, by some public and avowed act, such as entry is,' will declare his continuance to be tortious. (2 Blk. Com. 150.)
Further: section thirteen, as amended by the Act of 1862, assumes the rule of the common law to be as above stated; for it provides that when a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term, that a demand for delivery of possession “maybe made at any time within a year after the termination of the lease;” and if demand is so made, that thereupon the lessor may proceed to expel the tenant. The only change made in the common law by the Act of 1862 lies in the fact that it dispenses with formal entry and substitutes therefor a written demand.
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