Miller v. Van Tassel

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1864Published

Before: Rhodes

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Holding. The court held that an implied warranty of title in the sale of chattels is a presumption of law that may be rebutted by parol evidence, even when a written bill of sale exists, because such a warranty is not a term of the written contract.

Issues

Whether an implied warranty of title in a chattel sale can be contradicted by parol evidence when a written bill of sale exists.
Whether the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged a breach of warranty or deceit.
Whether a record from a federal court showing a claim of ownership without a final judgment is admissible to prove a breach of title.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The implied agreement of warranty does not form a portion of the contract in writing, and may be varied or contradicted by parol.”

“It is a general rule that oral and extrinsic evidence is admissible to rebut a presumption of law or equity.”

“A warranty of title of a chattel, not directly expressed, either verbally or in writing, is an implied agreement of the vendor, presumed by law from the concurring facts of the sale of the chattel by the vendor, and his possession”

Synopsis

Actions—Pleadings in.—The forms alone of the several actions have been abolished by statute, but the substantial allegations of the complaint in a given case must be the same under our practice as are required at common law.

Vendor of Chattels—Action against.—Under the forms of pleading at common law, the vendee of chatties sold with a warranty of title could, on a breach of the warranty, recover damages in assumpsit, or he might sue in an action on the case for deceit, if there had been deceit, as well as warranty of title; but, in the first case, he must aver specially that the defendant warranted his title to the property, and that a breach of the warranty had occured, and in the latter, that the defendant falsely or fraudulently represented himself to he the owner of the property, and that he knew his representations were false.

Same—Complaint on.—Under our practice, whichever ground of recovery the pleader adopts, his complaint must contain the same allegations of fact as were required at common law.

Objection to Evidence.—The ruling of a Court, during a trial, in excluding testimony, will he sustained if its introduction was improper, although counsel do not state the correct grounds of objection, provided the correct grounds, if stated, could not have been obviated.

Chattels—Warranty of Title.—The vendor of chattels in his possession warrants the same by implication. The warranty is a presumption of law arising from the possession of the vendor and the sale.

Same.—This presumption may he rebutted by proof on the part of the defendant that ho refused to give a warranty of title, and that the plaintiff agreed to take the property at his own risk.

Bill of Sale of Chattels—Warranty.—Where the vendor of chattels in his possession gives a written hill of sale to the vendee containing no covenant of warranty, there is an implied warranty, the same as though the sale was by parol.

Same.—Where the vendor of chattels in his possession gives a written hill of sale to the vendee, containing no covenant of warranty, the warranty arising by implication may be rebutted by parol evidence, the same as it could be if the sale was a verbal one.

Warranty of Chattels—Evidence of.—The record of a Court in an action to recover possession of personal property, containing the summons, proof of service, and a voluntary surrender of property, and dismissal of the action, is not admissible in evidence to show that the plaintiff in the possessory action owned the property, in an action between the defendant in the possessory action and his vendor of the same property.

By the Court, Rhodes, J. This action was brought by the vendee of an American jack to recover back from the vendor the purchase money, on the ground that the vendor had no title at the time of the sale. The first count of the complaint amounts merely to the common count for money had and received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. The second count states, in substance, that the defendant represented to plaintiff that he, the defendant, was the owner of and entitled to sell the property; that thereupon the defendant executed to the plaintiff a bill of sale of the property, a copy of which is inserted; that the plaintiff paid the defendant the price, and received possession of the property; that the United States is the owner, and reclaimed and took possession of the jack; that the sale was void, and that the plaintiff rescinded the sale and demanded from the defendant the price, with interest, and that defendant refused to pay the same.

The case was treated by the parties in the Court below as an action upon the warranty of title, and the counsel of both parties have submitted the case to this Court on that theory. But evidently no recovery can be had for a breach of the warranty under the first count, because it contains no allegation of a warranty. (Edick v. Crim, 10 Barb. 445.)

Under the forms of pleading at common law, the vendee of chattels sold with a warranty of title, could, on a breach of the warranty, recover in assumpsit, or he might sue in an action on the case for deceit, if there had been also deceit on the sale, as well as a warranty of title; but in either case, [463]the plaintiff was obliged to plead specially. (Chitty on Pleading, 383.)

The forms alone of the several actions have been abolished by the statute; the substantial allegations of the complaint, in a given case, must be the same under our Practice Act as are required at common law. The second count fails to state that the defendant warranted his title to the property, or that the property or the value thereof had been recovered from him by law by a person having a better title, or that any breach of the supposed warranty had occurred. Uor can it be considered as a count in case for deceit, for it is not alleged that the defendant falsely or fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the property, nor that he knew that his representations were false.

The defendant, in his answer, denies that the property was the property of the United States, that the sale was void, or that the plaintiff had the right to rescind the contract; and he sets up that the plaintiff bought the property at his own risk; in other words, he denies what is not alleged in the complaint—that is to say, that he warranted the title.

Miller v. Van Tassel

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