Wyman v. Banvard

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1863Published

Before: Cope, Crocker, Norton

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Holding. The Act of Congress granting sections sixteen and thirty-six to California for school purposes allows the State Legislature to pool the proceeds into a common school fund for the benefit of all schools throughout the State, rather than restricting funds to the specific township where the land is located. The Legislature may amend or repeal statutes governing the distribution of these funds without violating constitutional prohibitions against impairing the obligation of contracts.

Issues

Whether the Act of Congress granting sections sixteen and thirty-six to California requires proceeds to be used exclusively for schools within the township where the land is located.
Whether the State Legislature has the authority to distribute school fund proceeds derived from these lands to support a general system of common schools throughout the State.
Whether the Act of 1858 created a vested right or contract that prevented the Legislature from amending the distribution of school funds in the Act of 1861.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“These terms employed in the Act of Congress are an absolute and unconditional grant of all the sections of the public lands in the State numbered sixteen and thirty-six, for a distinct and specified object and purpose”

“The intention of Congress evidently was, that these lands should not be employed to sustain schools in particular portions of the State, leaving other portions destitute of such aid, but should be used to sustain a general system”

Synopsis

Appeal from the Eleventh Judicial District.

The complaint avers that under the Act of April 26th, 1858, providing for the sale of the State school lands, the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of certain townships of the surveyed public lands of Placer County were, on the eleventh day of January, 1860, sold — the purchasers giving the bonds for payment as required by the act; that the defendant is the Treasurer of Placer County, and has in his hands five hundred and fifty-six dollars of interest money paid upon said sales'; that the townships are organized school districts in which public schools are maintained; that the plaintiff is the assignee of certain warrants drawn by the School Superintendent upon defendant for the said interest money, on account of services rendered in the public schools in said townships, and that defendant refuses to pay the warrants.

Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and plaintiff had judgment, from which the defendant appeals.

Crocker, J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Cope, C. J. and Norton, J. concurring. The question involved in this case relates to the proper construction of the Act of Congress granting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of the public lands to the State of California for school purposes, and the statutes of this State providing for the sale thereof, and the application of the proceeds of such sale. Sec. 6 of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1853, providing for the survey of the public lands in this State, and for other purposes, provides that all the public lands in the State of California, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, “ with the exception of sections sixteen and thirty-six, which shall be and are hereby granted to the State for the purposes of public schools in each township,” and with other exceptions, shall be subject to the preemption laws. The respondent contends that these sections are granted for the purpose of establishing and maintaining public schools in the township where such sections are located, and cannot be used in support of a system of schools common to the whole State. In this "he is clearly mistaken. These terms employed in the Act of Congress are an absolute and unconditional grant of all the sections of the public lands in the State numbered sixteen and thirty-six, for a distinct and specified object and purpose, and that is for the purpose of establishing and maintaining “ public schools in each township ” in the State. Neither the lands nor the proceeds thereof can be used for any other purpose. But Congress did not attempt to impose any conditions or specify or define the mode or manner in which this purpose should be carried into effect. It left that whole subject to the discretion of the Legislature of the State. The grant is made and the purpose specified; that is all. If the Legislature saw fit [530]to provide that these lands should be sold, and the proceeds placed in one common school fund, the interest on which should be applied equally to the support of all the common schools in each township in the State, there is nothing in the terms of the grant prohibiting them from so doing, but on the contrary the words employed properly sustain that construction. The “public schools” spoken of are not those of the township in which the particular sections are located, but “ each township;” that is, each township in the State. The intention of Congress evidently was, that these lands should not be employed to sustain schools in particular portions of the State, leaving other portions destitute of such aid, but should be used to sustain a general system of public schools common to the whole State, and extending to “ each township ” in the State.

Wyman v. Banvard

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Synopsis

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