Mills v. Tukey
Before: Cope, Norton
Synopsis
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District.
Application by D. 0. Mills for a writ of assistance to-obtain possession of an equal undivided one-third interest in and to lot number four, in the Mock or square between J and K streets, and Fourth and Fifth streets, of the City of Sacramento. The proceeding in the Court below was instituted under and by virtue of Sec. 5 of an Act of the Legislature, passed April 3d, 1860, entitled “ An Act to provide for the collection of Delinquent Taxes in the City and County of Sacramento.” In 1859, the lot in question belonged to Judson Haycock and George B. Haycock, as owners of one-third; to Carsilla Tukey, as owner of one-third; and to Francis Tukey, the defendant, as owner of one-third thereof. The taxes assessed upon it for the fiscal year ending March 1st, 1859, amounting, with costs and charges, to $2,844 35, not having been paid by these parties, judgment for that sum was recovered against them, by virtue of the statute above mentioned, on the twelfth day of November, 1860, in the District Court of the Sixth- Judicial District, in favor of The People of the State of California. Under this judgment, execution was issued against the said parties, directed to the Sheriff of the City and County of Sacramento, commanding him to make the said sum of money out of their personal, or, if that were insufficient, out of their real estate. He levied upon and sold the premises above described on the twenty-third day of September, 1861, to D. 0. Mills, for $2,832 90, and delivered to him a certificate of sale thereof. Afterwards, on the fourteenth day of April, 1862,'more than six months having elapsed^ since said sale, and the term of office of the Sheriff having expired\\ and he having left the State, a deed was executed to Mills by BX B. Redding, who was the deputy of said Sheriff up to the expiration of his term of office. At and prior to the time when the judgment for taxes was recovered, D. 0. Mills held a mortgage fpr $6,000 on the above premises, one-third whereof, $2,000, was due from the defendant, Francis Tukey. After the recovery of said judgment, but before the sale thereunder, D. O. Mills became, by' purchase, lie owner of the one-third interest in said premises which belonged to Judson and George B. Haycock. When the property was bought by D. O. Mills at the Sheriff’s sale, he and the said Carsilla Tukey and the defendant, Francis Tukey, were, and have ever since remained, in possession, each of a third of the premises. The claim of D. 0. Mills to the one-third interest of Carsilla Tukey having been satisfactorily adjusted, and the defendant having refused to surrender possession of the third held by him, this proceeding was instituted for its recovery. Prior to the sale of the premises for taxes, to wit: on the eighteenth day of July, 1861— Francis Tukey, then being indebted to D. 0. Mills in the sum of $2,000 on the mortgage aforesaid, and in other sums of money, and desiring to procure a loan of $4,000 to cancel said indebtedness, and also enable him to pay his proportion of the said taxes, proposed to said D. O. Mills that the latter should temporarily take from him a mortgage for $4,000 upon his third interest in said premises, and assign said mortgage to the party from whom said Tukey should afterwards be able to procure said loan. To this proposition, as Tukey believed he could in this way obtain the loan, Mills assented, and the $4,000 mortgage was executed to him. Tukey failed to either obtain the $4,000 loan, or to pay the taxes, wherefore the property was sold, and the $4,000 mortgage still remains in Mills’ hands unassigned. Upon these facts appearing in the petition and answer, and from the evidence on the trial, the District Court ordered the writ of assistance to issue. Defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and from these orders he appeals.
Cope, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Norton, J. concurring. This is an appeal for an order granting a writ of assistance to put the plaintiff in possession of an undivided interest in certain property in the City of Sacramento. The proceeding was instituted [378]under the fifth section of an Act of the Legislature, passed April 3d, 1860, entitled “An Act to provide for the Collection of Delinquent Taxes in the City and County of Sacramento.” The section provides, that “ any deed derived from a sale of real property under this act shall be conclusive evidence of title, except as against actual frauds and prepayment, of the taxes, and shall entitle the holder thereof to a writ of assistance from' the District Court to obtain possession of such property.” The sale was made by one Marshall, who was then Sheriff of Sacramento County, and the deed was executed by his deputy after the expiration of his term of office and during his absence from the State.
It is objected that the deputy had no authority to execute the deed; and the Act of 1858, “ for the relief of purchasers at sales of real estate by public officers,” is referred to as sustaining the objection. The act (Sec. 1) provides, that “ where lands have been or may hereafter be sold by a Sheriff, or other authorized officer, for taxes, or under an execution or order of sale, the purchaser or his assigns may be entitled to a deed, and the Sheriff or other officer who made the sale is dead, or absent from the State, or in any wise disqualified, it shall or may be lawful for the successor of the said Sheriff, or other officer, to make such deed to such purchaser, his assignee or assignees, in the same manner and with the same effect, as if made by the officer malting such sale.” ' Under the law as it stood prior to the passage of this act, the successor of the officer making the sale had no power to execute the deed, and the effect of the act is simply to confer upon him the power to do so. It takes nothing from the authority of the officer who made the sale; and his power to execute the deed, either by deputy or in person, continues as before. The object was to relieve the purchaser and not to limit the power of the officer. In case of death or disqualification, of course the deed must be executed by the successor, and it may be executed by him in the case of absence. In the latter case, however, his authority is not exclusive, unless the absence be such as to amount to a disqualification. The whole subject is a matter of statutory regulation, and there is nothing in the act in question operating as a repeal or modification of previous statutes.
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