Spence v. Harvey

Norton, J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Cope, C. J. and Crocker, J. concurring. This action is brought to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of a breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in a lease executed by the defendants to the plaintiff. The action was tried by the Court without a jury, and upon the findings of fact a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appeal.

The facts in brief are these: The plaintiff, in expectation of receiving a commission as postmaster of Placerville, entered into an agreement with the defendants whereby they leased to him certain premises for the term of one year, with the right on his part to extend the term so long as he should remain postmaster, not exceeding four years, in consideration of the sum of one dollar per year, and his agreement to locate and continue the post-office on the premises so leased; and he on his part covenanted that as soon as he received his commission he would remove the post-office to the leased premises, and continue the same there for all the time he should hold the office of postmaster, and not remove the same during or within that time. He, in pursuance of the agreement, removed the post-office to the leased premises, but after a certain time they, by collusion and fraud, caused him to be evicted under a paramount title, to wit, by willfully refusing to pay the rent on a lease under which they held, and instigating their landlord to evict the tenants in consequence of such rent not being paid. The value [340]of the rent or use of the premises was seven hundred and twenty dollars a year. The judgment was for $1,058 40, being the amount of this value of the lease, less the sum of one dollar a year, from the time of eviction, on the seventeenth day of January, 1860, to the seventh day of October, 1861, at which time he ceased to be postmaster.

The defendants insist, among other things, that the contract on which the action is brought is against public policy and void. We think this defense is well taken.

It is not disputed but that contracts against public policy are illegal and void; but the plaintiff insists that the contract in question is not of that character.

“ Public policy ” is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not be disputed. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts (Sec. 546), says: “ It has never been defined by the Courts, but has been left loose and free of definition, in the same manner as fraud. This rule may, however, be safely laid down, that wherever any. contract conflicts with the morals of the time and contravenes any established interest of society, it is void, as being against public policy.” In illustration of this rule, he says (Sec. 576): “ Where, therefore, a person occupying a public office agrees, for a reward, to exercise his official influence in questions affecting both public and private rights so as to bring about the private advantage of persons interested, the contract would be void. For every public officer is bound to be disinterested in the consideration of all public questions, and any contract which interferes with the free and unbiassed exercise of his judgment in relar tion to a question of trust or confidence reposed in him, is against public policy and good morals.” “ Again (Sec. 577) : Contracts for the sale of public offices come under this class of contracts in violation of public duty and are void. And this rule obtains upon the ground that they tend to destroy the responsibilities of the office, and to betray the interests of the public.” “ So, also, the profits and emoluments of a public office of trust are not a good subject of sale. Thus it has been held, that the prize money of a sailor, or the full pay or half pay of an officer is not assignable at law, nor in equity, upon the ground that any salary paid for the