Brooks v. Crosby
Before: Cope, Norton
Synopsis
Appeal from the Twelfth Judicial District.
This is an action of ejectment brought by B. S. Brooks against William Crosby and others, executors of John Clyne, to recover twenty acres of land lying within the limits of the City of San Francisco. Plaintiff derives his title from one Foley, and on the trial sought to recover by showing a prior possession of the premises in Foley. Both Foley and Clyne, the defendants’ testator, were living upon the premises in 1853, and the principal question mooted was as to which of the two were in the actual possession at that time. The testimony was voluminous and conflicting, that of plaintiff tending to show that the occupation of Clyne was under Foley, and that of defendants that Clyne had a possession independent and adverse.
On the trial plaintiff offered in evidence the deposition of one Welch, which had been taken in another case. It had been stipulated by the parties in the present action, “ that the deposition of A. Welch, taken in the case of Zenos Coffin v. John Clyne in this Court, may be used in evidence with the same force and effect, and subject to the same exceptions and objections in all respects as if taken in this case.” Ho objection to the competency of the witness was taken in the deposition. From certain deeds which were in evidence it appeared that Welch had once been the owner of the premises by conveyance from Foley, and that he had only, so far as these deeds showed, parted with a portion of the title, still remaining the owner of an undivided interest. The deposition showed an examination of Welch upon the question of his interest in the same premises sought to be recovered in this action, in which he stated that he had once owned an interest but had sold it. Defendants objected to the reading of the deposition on the ground of interest in the witness; the objection was overruled and defendants excepted.
The plaintiff called as a witness one Shear, and in the course of his examination in chief a deed was introduced which showed that witness had once owned an undivided interest in the premises. Defendants cross-examined him at length on other matters, and then moved to strike out his evidence on the ground that he was interested, which the Court denied, and defendants excepted. Plaintiff then proposed to question the witness for the purpose of disproving his apparent interest. Defendants objected on the ground that the interest having been shown aliunde by a deed, could not be disproved by his own evidence. The Court overruled the objection and defendants excepted, and the witness then stated that he had sold all his interest to one Parsons before the commencement of the action.
The plaintiff, in making out his case, introduced evidence tending to show that Clyne had occupied the premises as tenant of Foley, and proved admissions of Clyne that he had paid Foley rent. The defendants’ evidence tended to disprove any tenancy. After defendants rested, plaintiff called in rebuttal one Harkness, and proposed to prove by him that he knew of Clyne having paid rent to Foley. Defendants objected on the ground that the evidence was not proper in rebuttal; that plaintiff having in his chief examination gone into this question should have exhausted his proof upon it. The objection was overruled and exception taken by defendants.
Opinion — Copenorton
Cope, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Norton, J. concurring. This is an action to recover of the defendants the possession of twenty acres of land in the City and County of San Francisco. The complaint alleges that on a certain day the plaintiff was seized and possessed of the land in question, and that the defendants entered and ousted him. The answer denies the allegations of the complaint, and sets up the Statute of Limitations.
On the trial the plaintiff relied upon the prior possession of one Foley, and others, under whom he claims. The case was tried by a jury and the plaintiff obtained a verdict, and we are asked to review the evidence, which is claimed to have been insufficient to justify the action of the jury. On this point it is only necessary to say that the evidence is of such a character as to preclude interference on our part; it is voluminous and conflicting, and we cannot undertake to say that the jury arrived at an erroneous conclusion.
[50]The objection to the deposition of Welch is untenable. The deposition was taken in another case, and there was a stipulation that it should be used on the trial “ with the same force and effect, and subject to the same exceptions and objections in all respects as if taken in this case.” When the deposition was offered it was objected that the witness was incompetent from interest, but we regard the stipulation as a waiver of this objection. The effect of the stipulation was to place the deposition upon the same footing as if it had been taken in the present case, and it is a settled rule that a party who appears at the taking of a deposition, and examines the witness without objecting to his competency, cannot afterwards interpose the objection. We understand the stipulation as reserving only such “ exceptions and objections ” as could properly be taken when the deposition should be offered in evidence.
There is nothing in the point that the Court erred in refusing to strike out the testimony of the witness Shear. His interest, if he had any, appeared during his direct examination, and the motion to strike out was not made until the defendants had cross-examined him. Of course, it was made too late, as the defendants could not, knowing the interest of the witness, take their chances of a cross-examination, and subsequently avail themselves of the objection to get rid of the evidence.
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