People ex rel. Burr v. Dana
Before: Cope, Field
Synopsis
Appeal from the Twelfth Judicial District.
The complaint avers, that in the City of San Francisco there is a street known as “ East Street,” which is one hundred and thirty-seven and a half feet wide, and extends from Jackson to Folsom Street; that by an Act of March 26th, 1851 (generally known as the Water Lot Bill), it was provided that all the lots within certain boundaries therein named were known and designated as beach and water lots, and the eastern line of East Street, from Jackson to Folsom streets, was declared to be one of the boundaries of said beach and water lots, which provision was intended for the purpose of establishing, opening, and dedicating East Street to public use as a street; that by the Act of April 26th, 1858, it was provided that all the streets within the water line front of the city, as laid down on the official map and high water mark, and all the streets mentioned and referred to in the aforesaid Act of March 26th, 1851, to the full extent of said streets as laid down on the map or plat of J. J. Gardiner, Surveyor, were confirmed, established, and dedicated to the public use as streets; that East Street is one of the streets so confirmed, established, and dedicated; that it is the street mentioned and referred to in each of the aforesaid acts; that it is one of the streets lying between high water mark and the water fine front of the city; that it is one of the streets laid down on the official map, and also on Gardiner’s map; and that the foregoing provision was inserted in the Act of 1858 for the purpose of establishing, confirming, and dedicating East Street to public use as a street; that on June 26th, 1856, the Board of Aldermen and Assistant Aider-men of the city passed an ordinance, which was approved by the Mayor, declaring East Street open from Folsom to Olay Street, and dedicating it to public use as laid down on the official map; that on June 30th, 1856, the said Board of Aldermen and Assistant Aldermen passed another ordinance, which was approved by the Mayor, declaring East Street open from Clay to Jackson Street,, and dedicating it to public use as a street as laid down on the official map; that for more than six years last past East Street has been and is now a common and public highway or street for the people of the State, and during said time has been repaired from time to time at the expense of the property owners adjoining the street, and at the expense of the inhabitants of the city by means of assessments upon the adjoining lots or blocks by virtue of certain Acts of the Legislature; that all the people of the State ought to have a free right of transit over said street, but that defendants have lately obstructed said street with buildings from Clay to Jackson Street so as to prevent travel over the same, and they threaten to continue said obstructions; that unless said obstructions are removed all travel over said street will be thereby prevented, and that said obstructions are a public nuisance; that the relator and other citizens have often requested the defendants to remove the nuisance, but they refuse to do so, and falsely pretend that the ground covered by said buildings is not a public street.
Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Field, C. J. concurring. This is an action to abate a nuisance caused by the erection of buildings upon what is alleged to be a public street in the City of San Francisco, known as East Street. The case is important simply in its public aspect, and the value of the property to be affected by its decision; the principles involved are of little consequence. The only question is whether East Street extends along the water front of the city from Folsom Street to Jackson Street, as the plaintiffs contend, or merely from Folsom to Market, as‘is contended by the defendants. The buildings complained of are situated between Washington and Jackson streets, and the property is claimed by the defendants under a title derived from the State, and under a purchase at an execution sale as the property of the city. There is no question of the validity of them title, unless the property had been dedicated to public use as a street.
The plaintiffs contend that the property had been so dedicated, and in support of their position they rely chiefly upon an Act of the Legislature passed in 1851, commonly known as the Water Lot Act. It is entitled “ An Act to provide for the disposition of certain Property of the State of California,” and the property is described by metes and bounds, and designated as the “ San Fran[20]cisco Beach and Water Lots.” It provides that the boundary line therein set forth shall be and remain the permanent water front of the city, and gives to the city, with certain exceptions, the use and occupation of the property described for the term of ninety-nine years. One of the boundaries given is the “ Eastern line of East Street, to its point of intersection with the northern line of Jackson Street;” the initial point of the boundary thus given being on the southern line of Folsom Street. On the official map of the city, which was before the Legislature when the act was passed, East Street is laid down as extending only from Folsom Street to Market, and there is no evidence that it extended north of Market Street prior to that time. It is claimed that the reference in the act to its eastern line as a boundary, operated as an extension and dedication of it from Market Street to Jackson.
This point was before us in Jacobs v. Kruger (19 Cal. 411), and we there held that the construction contended for was inadmissible ; that the dedication of a street was foreign to the purposes of the act, and not within the intention of the Legislature. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a statute must be construed with reference to the objects intended to be accomplished by it, and the only object of the act in question was to provide for the disposition of the water lot property. Its provisions point to that object alone, and it is impossible, if we are to be governed by the ordinary rules of construction, to regard a mere reference to a street for the purpose of designating a boundary as extending the street itself. The intention of the Legislature was merely to establish a boundary, and the eastern line of East Street was adopted for convenience and certainty in fixing its location and course. This is the more apparent from the fact that the boundary established is longer than the eastern line of East Street, even if the street were extended, its initial and terminating points being separated from that street by Folsom Street at one end, and by Jackson Street at the other. These points could only be ascertained by protracting the fine at each-end of the street; and as the protracted line was necessarily in the mind of the Legislature, there is no ground for supposing that the intention was to extend the street. It is superfluous, however, to discuss the question, for the case cited is directly .in point,
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