Rico v. Spence

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1863Published

Before: Field

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Holding. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim to the land because the parties claimed under independent grants for different premises, and the plaintiffs failed to show any fiduciary relationship or equitable grounds to impeach the defendant's patent.

Issues

Whether the plaintiffs could maintain an action to quiet title without possession of the premises.
Whether the plaintiffs could impeach the defendant's patent based on an unconfirmed grant.
Whether the plaintiffs established any equitable interest or fiduciary relationship to control the defendant's legal title.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“This fact that the parties claim under independent-grants, covering different premises, of itself disposes of the case.”

“The plaintiffs do not show the possession of any equities which can control the legal title.”

Synopsis

To maintain an action to quiet title, under the two hundred and fifty-fourth section of the Civil Practice Act, it is essential that the plaintiff have possession of the premises when the action is commenced.

Until the validity of a grant from the Spanish or Mexican Government has been determined by the tribunals of the United States, under the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, it cannot be made the basis for impeaching a patent for the same premises.

Thus, where the validity of the claim of the defendant, under a Mexican grant, had been recognized and confirmed, and a patent to him issued thereon by the United States: Held, that the plaintiff, relying solely upon an opposing unconfirmed grant from the Mexican Government, embracing the same premises, could not call in question the rights of the defendant, either in law or equity.

Where claimants under Spanish or Mexican grants have never presented their claims for confirmation, under the Act of March 3d, 1851, such claims are to be treated as non-existent, and the land, so far as they are concerned, is to be considered as part of the public domain.

Where the parties each claimed the same premises under independent Mexican grants, and the defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiff's claim, proceeded to obtain a confirmation of his claim and a patent therefor: Held, that no equities could arise in favor of the plaintiff, and against defendant, from the latter’s knowledge of the adverse claim, nor was he, by reason of this knowledge, affected with notice of any equitable rights of the plaintiff.

Field, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court Cope, J. and Norton, J. concurring.

The Court below appears to have treated this action as brought under the statute to quiet the title of the plaintiffs to a tract of land situated in Monterey County, and to have ordered its dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the premises at its commencement. Such possession of the plaintiffs was essential to maintain an action of this character. (Prac. Act, sec. 254.) But the defendants contend that the action was brought not merely to quiet the title of the plaintiffs, but also to establish and enforce a trust. The complaint sets forth that a grant of the premises was issued in 1822 to Jose Santiago Estrada, through whom the plaintiffs trace their title; that the defendant David Spence presented a claim for the same premises to the Board of Land Commissioners, alleging that a grant of them was made in 1823 to Jose Mariano Estrada, through whom he deraigns his title ; that the claim was confirmed; that subsequently a patent for the land was issued to him by the United States; that the confirmation was obtained by fraud and false representations; and that the mesne conveyances to him and the patent constitute-a cloud upon the plaintiffs’ title; and concludes with a prayer that the mesne conveyances be set aside, that he be enjoined from making any claim to the premises, and be decreed to convey the same to the plaintiffs, and for general relief.

The answer of the defendant Spence denies all the allegations of the complaint which affect his rights to the premises in controversy, and sets up several special defenses which it is not material to notice.

The evidence shows that the grant to Jose Santiago Estrada embraces different premises from those claimed by the plaintiffs; that the premises which it cedes were called “ Buena Vista,” and are situated on the south side of Salinas or Monterey River; and that the premises granted to José Mariano Estrada were called [511]“ Llano Buena Vista,” and are situated on the north side of the same river. This fact that the parties claim under independent-grants, covering different premises, of itself disposes of the case.

But if the fact were otherwise, and the two grants covered the same premises, the case presented would only be one of conflicting grants. Neither can be made the basis for impeaching a patent for the same premises until its validity has been determined by the tribunals of the United States, under the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851. And as the validity of the claim of the defendant Spence under the grant to José Mariano Estrada has been recognized and confirmed, and a patent issued to him, the claimants under the opposing unconfirmed grant, even if it embrace the same premises, relying solely upon such grant, cannot call in question his rights either in law or equity. It does not appear from the record whether those claimants have ever presented their claim for confirmation. If they have not done so their claim is to be treated as non-existent, and the land, so far as they are concerned, as part of the public domain. (Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 269.)

Rico v. Spence

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