Fall v. Cty. of Sutter
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
Franchises for erecting toll-bridges, or ferries, being sovereign prerogatives, belong to the political power of the State, and are primarily represented and granted by the Legislature as the head of the political power. •
Where the power of granting these franchises has been by legislative enactment delegated to subordinate tribunals, as in this State to the Courts of Sessions and Boards of Supervisors, such tribunals are only agents of the Legislature in this respect.
Grants made by these subordinate tribunals by virtue of the authority thus delegated, are equally valid as if made by the Legislature directly, and the effect of a grant by them is to give a right of property to the grantee or licensee which it is not in the power of the Legislature to divest or transfer to another, so long as the owner holds in obedience to law.
Grants of franchises of this character, not being exclusive in their terms, do not confer upon the grantees any exclusive right to the line of travel which is accommodated by them, or to its profits, and do not estop the granting power from making other grants of like character, the effect of which is to impair the value and take away the profits of the franchise first granted.
Where the grant of such franchises is not in terms exclusive, the Government holding this power, to tie exercised for the public interest and convenience, is not to be presumed to part with its right to make other grants which may impair the value of the first, and will not be held to have done so except where such an intent appears affirmatively and plainly. This intent is not shown from a mere grant of the franchise or privilege.
The provisions of the Acts of 1850 and 1855, concerning bridges and ferries, prohibiting the subordinate granting tribunals from licensing a second bridge or ferry within one mile of a former one, except under certain conditions, one of which is where a second grant is required by the public convenience,'impose no restrictions upon the power of the Legislature in making other grants.
The question of what the public convenience requires, is a political not a legal one. Its decision rests with the Legislature and depends upon its discretion, the exercise of which, in the granting of a subsequent franchise, is conclusive and not reviewable in a Court of Justice.
Under the Act of 1850 concerning public ferries, the plaintiffs, in 1852, obtained from the Court of Sessions of Tuba County, a license to construct and maintain a toll-bridge across the Feather Kiver, at a point near the city of Marysville, and constructed and have since maintained, at the point indicated, a bridge sufficient to accommodate the line of travel, and have complied with all the provisions of the law regulating franchises of this character. In 1859 the Legislature by special act granted to the defendants the privilege of constructing another bridge within six hundred feet of that of plaintiffs, and calculated to accommodate the same lino of travel, and to impair greatly the profits and value of plaintiffs' franchise. Defendants having commenced the construction of a bridge under this act, plain tifis brought this action to enjoin its completion and its use for the purpose intended: Held, that plaintiffs were not entitled to the injunction.
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Cope, J. concurring.
This bill was filed to restrain the defendants from building and setting up a free bridge over the Feather River, at or near Marysville. The ground of complaint is, that the plaintiffs are the owners and possessors of a licensed toll-bridge near by. The plaintiffs aver that the franchise was acquired in 1852 by the plaintiff Hanson ; that since the acquiring of the franchise the holders thereof, assigns, etc., have done everything required of them by law; that all the franchises, property, etc., in connection with the bridge, have been held by the present plaintiffs since 1855 ; that in 1852 plaintiff Hanson and cocorporators, under the name of the Yuba City and Marysville Bridge Company (having been previously organized as a corporation in this name) made due application to the Court of Sessions of the county of Yuba for authority to construct their bridge, and duly observed and fulfilled all the terms and requirements of the law; and on the fifth of October, 1852, that Court, by order, granted to the corporation authority to construct and a license to keep the same and collect the tolls thereon
[251]for twenty years; that the corporation did construct the bridge at great cost, and fulfilled the various provisions of law prescribing the duties of owners of bridges; that the corporation obtained renewals annually of the license from the Court of Sessions until this power was taken from that Court, and afterwards obtained such renewal from the Board of Supervisors since the change of the law giving this power to such Boards—paying license fees, and conforming to the laws in this respect; that the last of these licenses was granted for one year from the sixth day of August, 1860, when the plaintiffs executed bonds, and did the other things required of them to perfect their right. The bill further avers, that the defendants are proceeding to destroy the rights of the plaintiffs by the erection of a bridge across the Feather River, and within six hundred feet of the toll-bridge, which will prove utterly destructive of the value of the franchise of the plaintiffs. This is done under the color of the Act of the Legislature, passed April 11th, 1859, which grants the right and privilege to the County of Sutter of constructing and keeping across Feather River a bridge for public use, extending from Fifth Street of the city of Marysville, in the county of Tuba, to the opposite bank of the river, the cost of the bridge to be paid for partly by private subscription and donations, and partly by warrants to be drawn on the County Treasurer of Sutter County, and on a fund therein styled the Bridge Fund, and “ when said warrants are paid by toll derived from said bridge, then said bridge shall be free for all crossings of persons or property.” The bill goes on to aver, that the plaintiff’s bridge is, in every respect, sufficient for the public wants and convenience, and that the new bridge is not needed for public or private accommodation.
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