White v. Moses

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1862Published

Before: Norton

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that Alcalde grants are valid without proof of a Town Council order, that pueblo lands may be sold to raise municipal funds, and that defendants failed to prove possession or good-faith color of title. The judgment was affirmed as to defendants Moses and Wheaton but reversed as to defendants Banks and Winter due to insufficient evidence of their possession.

Issues

Whether an Alcalde grant is admissible without proof of a Town Council order.
Whether a pueblo may sell land at auction to raise municipal funds.
Whether defendants are entitled to a deduction for improvements without proof of good-faith color of title.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the possession of defendants Banks and Winter.

Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the Alcalde grant was properly admitted in evidence without proof of the order of the Town Council.”

“The fact, therefore, that the lot in question was sold at auction by direction of the Town Council, does not render the grant of the Alcalde void.”

“The judgment against Banks and Winter must, therefore, be reversed”

Synopsis

Air Alcalde of San Francisco had, in 1849, authority as such to make grants of the lands of that pueblo, and the same presumptions in regard to the regularity and effect of his proceedings attach to him as to other officers.

Where the grant of an Alcalde recited that he made it by virtue of the authority in him vested, and in pursuance of the order of the Town Council: Held, that his general authority to make the grant as Alcalde was not limited by the recital, and that the grant was admissible in support of the title of the grantee without proof of any order of the Town Council.

A grant by an Alcalde in 1849 of pueblo lands in San Francisco, was not invalidated by the fact that it was made in pursuance of a sale at public auction by order of the Town Council.

Where, in an action of ejectment, the proof shows that the entry of the defendants was upon a lot within the limits of an incorporated city, no presumption arises therefrom that they entered bona fide under any supposed rights amounting to color of title adverse to the owner, and under such proof they are not entitled to have the value of improvements made by them upon the premises deducted from the damages sustained by the plaintiff.

Norton, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Cope, J. concurring.

The first objection urged in this case is to the ruling of the Court below in allowing the Alcalde grant to be read in evidence, without proof of the order of the Town Council directing the sale which is recited in the grant.

The Alcalde states in the grant that he makes it by virtue of the authority in him vested, and in pursuance of the order of the Town Council. If the Alcalde had authority to make grants of the pueblo lands, the former of these powers was sufficient to sustain this grant, although the latter may not have existed. The law upon this point, whatever may be the opinions of individuals, or the determinations of tribunals not governed by our judgments, must be considered settled so far as it depends upon the decision of this Court. In the case of Cohas v. Raisin (3 Cal. 443) the Court announced these among other propositions: “ 2d. That the Alcaldes were the heads of the Ayuntamientos, or Town Councils, and rightfully exercised the power of granting lots.” “ 4th. That a grant of a lot by an Alcalde, whether a Mexican or any other nation, raises the presumption that the Alcalde was a properly qualified officer, that he had authority to make the grant, and that the land [41]was within the boundaries of the pueblo.” These propositions have not since been overruled, but have more than once been affirmed. In the case of Dewey v. Lambier, (7 Cal. 347) which was an action to recover a lot granted by Leavenworth, Alcalde, the Court, speaking of the case of Cohas v. Raisin, say: “ We take this occasion to approbate the same, and to announce our determination of adhering to it.” In the case of Welch v. Sullivan (8 Cal. 197) the Court say: “ It is a misnomer to call these titles American Alcalde grants. They were the grants of the pueblo of its own properly, which it had the right to transfer by virtue of the municipal law which was continued in force by the new sovereign until 1850. As to all grants made by the Alcaldes, it must be presumed that they were municipal lands which these officers had a right to grant, until the contrary is shown.” In the case of Payne and Dewey v. Treadwell, (16 Cal. 232, 239) which was an action to recover a lot held under a grant by an American Alcalde and decided as late as 1860, the Court say: “ Now, that the Alcalde is the proper officer to make the grant is 'unquestionable. The same presumptions in regard to the regularity and effect of his proceedings attach to him as to other officers.” “ Our conclusion is, that upon two distinct and independent grounds, the validity of these Alcalde grants may be safely rested: 1st, upon the title of the pueblo and the presumed authority of the Alcaldes, as the proper granting officers to grant lots within the pueblo.” In the case before us nothing appears in the record restricting the ordinary powers of the Alcalde as the proper granting officer to grant lots within the pueblo, and under the law as settled by the authorities above cited the Alcalde grant was properly admitted in evidence without proof of the order of the Town Council.

White v. Moses

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief