Babcock v. Middleton
Before: Cope, Field, Norton
Synopsis
The Act of May 1st, 1851, providing for the funding of the floating debt of the City of San Francisco, authorized a contract between the city and her creditors, and the contract having been executed, its obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent modification or repeal of the act.
The provisions of the act, which are mere legislative modes to give effect to the substantial purposes of the act, may be altered, provided the alteration does not affect the security of the creditors, who have accepted the bonds of the city under the act.
The object of the provision of the act requiring & public sale of the property conveyed to the Commissioners of the Funded Debt, when a sale is made, is to secure a fair price from the purchasers. If this object can be accomplished by a sale in any other mode, the obligation of the contract is not impaired by legislation authorizing such other mode.
The Act of April I4th, 1862, authorizing the Commissioners of the Funded Debt to compromise and settle certain claims made to real estate held by them, and to convey such real estate, is not unconstitutional. Its only object is to provide a new mode for the disposition of those portions of the property which cannot be advantageously disposed of at public sale, in consequence of existing doubts as to the title of the Commissioners.
Field, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Cope, J. and Norton, J. concurring. The Act of May 1st, 1851, to authorize the funding of the floating debt of the city of San Francisco, and to provide for the payment of the same, directs, in its twelfth section, the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, created by a previous ordinance of the city, to convey to the Commissioners of the Funded Debt created by the act certain property belonging to the city, and empowers the latter Commissioners “ to expose at public sale or to lease ” the property at such time and place as in them discretion the interest of the city may demand; and requires them to apply the proceeds of such sale or lease to the liquidation of the floating debt. Soon after the passage of the act, the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund executed the conveyance directed. The property consisted chiefly, if not entirely, of real estate situated in the city of San Francisco. Portions of this real estate, it is alleged, have never been “ sold, leased, dedicated, reserved or conveyed by the Commissioners,” but are in the actual possession of parties “ who have purchased the same in good faith and for valuable considerations,” and who, by themselves, or tenants, or persons through whom they claim, have been in such actual possession from and including January 1st, 1855. And by virtue of such actual possession, and the operation of an ordinance passed by the Common Council of the city of San Francisco on the [656]twentieth of June, 1855, commonly known as the Van Hess Ordinance, and the Act of the Legislature of March, 1858, confirmatory thereof, those parties, it is further alleged, claim to have become entitled to the interest and estate of the city. It is also suggested that the claims of the Commissioners of the Funded Debt to the real estate thus adversely possessed have become barred by the Statute of Limitations. Acting upon these allegations and this suggestion, and reciting them as the basis of its legislation, the Legislature, on the fourteenth of April of the present year, passed an act authorizing the Commissioners of the Funded Debt to compromise and settle with the parties, thus holding adversely to them, portions of the real estate conveyed by the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. (Laws of 1862, ch. 203.) The act provides that upon receiving a petition from persons thus claiming and in possession of portions of the real estate in question, alleging that they have been in the actual possession, by themselves, them tenants or parties through whom they claim, from and including January 1st, 1855 ; that the lands thus possessed have not been “ sold, leased, dedicated, reserved or conveyed ” by the Commissioners, and that the petitioners are purchasers of the same for a valuable consideration, and asking for a grant of the lands, the Commissioners of the Funded Debt shall proceed to take testimony as to the matters alleged; and empoivers them upon proof of the matters to award a grant, and upon payment of the expenses of the proceedings, and at least ten per cent, of the assessed value of the property, to execute a conveyance to the petitioners. Various provisions are embodied in the act to prevent fraud, and insure good faith in the proceedings, and to protect the rights of third persons, which it is unnecessary to notice for the disposition of the present case. It is sufficient to observe that the act is drawn Avith care, and is well calculated to protect the just rights of all parties, and to assure to the Commissioners of the Funded Debt a full equivalent for their title—such as under the circumstances they could obtain from a public sale of the property.
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