Sheldon v. S.S. Uncle Sam
Before: Cope
Synopsis
Husband and wife cannot recover jointly in an action by them ex contractu for the breach of a contract made with defendant for the transportation of the wife from San Francisco to New York.
But if, in such action, no demurrer be interposed, and if the facts stated and proven show that plaintiffs are entitled to relief for fraud practiced by defendant, or for personal injury to the wife, then the action to that extent is well brought; and relief will not be denied on the ground that the same facts would support an action on the contract in which the husband alone can recover.
Husband and wife must join in an action for an injury done to the person of the latter; and it is immaterial that the injury is charged to have been committed in violation of a contract.
Where the breach of a contract is a wrong, the party may sue in tort instead of suing upon the contract.
In an action under the three hundred and seventeenth section of the Practice Act by husband and wife against a steamship for injuries inflicted upon her, plaintiffs cannot recover disbursements or expenditures by the husband. For these he must sue alone.
The liability of the steamship in such case is measured by that of the owners, and extends to the entire injury sustained.
The practice in Courts of Admiralty has no application tb actions brought under this section of our statute.
Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Field, C. J. concurring.
This is an action brought under the provisions of the three hundred and seventeenth section of the Practice Act, to recover damages for the malperformance of a contract made with the Accessory Transit Company of Nicaragua, to convey Catherine Sheldon, wife of James Sheldon, from San Francisco to New York, by what was known as the Nicaragua route. This company were the owners of a number of steamships engaged as common carriers in the transportation of persons and property, for hire, between those points, and the contract provided for the conveyance of Mrs. Sheldon from San Francisco to San Juan del Sur, in Nicaragua, and thence by the usual route to her destination at New York. The defendant was one of the steamships belonging to and employed for these purposes by the company, and. was- designated in the contract as -the vessel to be used in the voyage from San Francisco to San Juan del Sur. The contract was made in April, 1856, and a short time previous thereto the company were in possession, and had the exclusive control, under a charter from the Government of Nicaragua, of the transit across the Isthmus upon that route. When the contract was entered into, however, this charter had been annulled, and the company and their agents were fully advised of that fact, and knew that the contract could not be carried out. With this knowledge in their possession, they had published in the newspapers a notice upon the subject, the object and effect of which were to mislead the public; and it is averred, and the jury expressly find, that the plaintiffs were deceived thereby into making the contract. The facts were not communicated until after the departure of the defendant from San Francisco, and the company were so situated that the passengers were compelled to submit to the imposition which had been practiced upon them. It was then announced that the defendant, instead of stopping at San Juan del Sur, would proceed to Panama, in New Granada, and the passengers were assured that upon crossing the Isthmus to Aspinwall, they would be taken on board by a steamer and carried without delay to New York. When these assurances were given, no means of transportation beyond [533]Aspinwall had been provided, and in giving them the company must have been actuated by a deliberate purpose of deception. The complaint charges, and the jury find, that Mrs. Sheldon was taken to Panama without her consent, or that of her husband; that she was compelled to disembark in an open boat during a severe rain, and was transported to Aspinwall by railroad in a coal car; that she was detained at Aspinwall seventeen days, during which period she was abandoned by the company, and left without protection or assistance; that the food and accommodations at Aspinwall were bad, and the climate unhealthy; that the acts complained of were committed in a spirit of recklessness, and from wanton and malicious motives.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)