Grady v. Early
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
The mining claim in this case, being a claim on a river bar, is sufficiently described in the complaint. See facts.
Where, in a civil case, Taylor, a juror, had been accepted by both parties, and subsequently, during the examination of another juror, the fact came out that there had been a former trial of forcible entry and detainer for the same ground now in dispute, and Taylor then of his own accord stated that the title to the ground had been spoken of in the forcible entry case, and that his mind was made up as to the title; and the plaintiffs thereupon challenged Taylor for cause, and the Court excused Mm, defendants resisting, on the ground that it was too late: Held, that there is no error; that where the Court below exercised its discretion in excusing a juror to attain justice, this Court would interfere with great reluctance.
In ejectment for mining claims and for damages, defendants, entry being laid October 31st, 1859, and the suit brought in March, 1860, plaintiff called as a witness W., who was one of the owners of the claims from the fall of 1858 to Eebruary, 1860, when he sold to plaintiff, dut-ing which time the damages accrued: Held, that the witness was competent as against the objection that he was interested, because a -recovery by plaintiff would not necessarily give a right of action to the witness for damages accruing- before the conveyance and recovery ; and the record of such recovery would not be conclusive, if any proof of Ms title.
In ejectment, plaintiffs may rely on prior possession, and the legal title is not necessarily involved. And a judgment in favor of plaintiff, even on the title, is conclusive, at most, of the title of plaintiff only, and not-of his grantor.
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Cope, J. concurring.
1. The first objection is to the complaint, because the premises, a mining claim, are not described with sufficient definiteness. The point is not well taken.
2. There is no good objection to the excusing of the juror. The statement by the juror was sufficient to justify the Court in discharging him. The object is to get a fair and impartial trial; and in civil cases we should interfere with great reluctance with the discretion of the Court in excusing a juror when it thought the purposes of justice were to be subserved by excusing him. Except under very peculiar circumstances, it is difficult to see how the erroneous exercise of a mere discretion in excusing a juror in a civil case could operate to the prejudice of a party. We see no error in the ruling in this case.
[1113]. It is not apparent that the witnesses were incompetent. The recovery by the grantee of the witnesses would not necessarily give a right of action to the grantors for damages accruing before the conveyance and recovery. We are not cited to any authority which holds that a recovery in ejectment, even upon the title, affirms the existence of a title in the grantor, and that the record is conclusive or any proof of the grantor’s title. For all that appears, the plaintiff may have rested his recovery upon the mere fact of prior possession, and the legal title may not have been involved in the issue at all. We apprehend that, at the most, the judgment is only conclusive of the title of the plaintiffs, not of his predecessors. There is nothing in the point as to the amendment of the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
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