People v. Hobson
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
Where the Justices composing the Court of Sessions, on motion for new trial— defendant having been convicted of assault with intent to murder—were not the same Justices composing the Court during the trial—one member being different—and this fact appears only by the minutes of the Court, reciting the names of the members thereof, and defendant does not object, on the motion, to the Justice who had not previously taken part in the proceedings: Held, that the objection is waived; that it does not go to the power of the new Justice to act, but merely to the propriety of his acting; and that, though it is better for jhe members of the Court who heard the trial to sit on the motion for new trial, still it is not a statutory right of defendant.
Held, further, that the rule laid down in People v. Connor, (infra) that the same presumptions of regularity attach to proceedings in Courts of Sessions as in District Courts, covers this case; and that the presumption is that a sufficient reason existed for the change in the bench.
If from resignation, or other such cause, one of the Justices of the Court of Sessions, after a trial, should not be able to sit on the motion for new trial, this would not prevent the motion from being passed upon by another Justice acting in the place of the one thus incapacitated.
Cases might arise where this point alone, or in connection with other matters, would entitle a party to a new trial, or to a hearing of his motion before the Justices presiding at the trial; but in the absence of a showing of some special cause, this single circumstance is not ground of reversal.
Although the Supreme Court will reverse a judgment in a criminal case where the Court below refuses an instruction asked by defendant, on the ground that the instruction has already in substance been given, without informing the jury that the refusal is for this cause, yet the rule is subject to the qualification that the language of the instruction asked be clear and explicit, and leave no reason for doubt or misconstruction—in short, free from objection.
It is not error to charge the jury on a criminal trial—the defense being insanity— that “ the true test of insanity is whether the accused at the time of the commission of the crime was conscious that he was doing what he ought not to do.”
Where on trial for assault with intent to murder by shooting with a pistol—the defense being insanity—the defendant, as part of the proofs, “ admitted the
shooting as charged, and that it was done under circumstances that would have constituted murder if the defense set up is not good,” and the Court instructed the jury that if the defendant was not insane at the time of the shooting, they ought to find him guilty as charged in the indictment: Held, that the charge was right; that, taking the whole admission together, the Court had a right to assume the facts as therein admitted to be true.
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Field, C. J. concurring.
The defendant was convicted of an assault with intent to murder.
I. The first error assigned is, that the proceedings were irregular in this: that the motion for a new trial was passed on by a Court composed of different members from those before whom the trial was had. This fact only appears by the minutes, in which the [429]names of the Justices composing the Court on the motion and in the previous stages of the trial are recited. No objection to the hearing of the motion by the Justices then present and acting was made by the prisoner.
We intimated in a previous case the danger of a reversal of a judgment of conviction for this cause, though no express decision was made upon the point. The question has been more fully argued. We think under the circumstances here, that the defendant cannot maintain the error assigned. His failure to object to the Justice not sitting before, was itself a waiver of exception for this cause. The objection does not go to the power of the Justice to act, but is merely in the light of an exception to him because it was more proper that the J ustiee who sat during the trial, and who, therefore, may be supposed to be better acquainted with the history of the case, should pass upon the final motion which involved a review of the previous proceedings. If the defendant was willing that the Justice should sit, he should not be allowed the double advantage of trying his motion before him, and of appealing from the decision if adverse, and also the advantage of contesting the propriety of his sitting. Besides, we think that the rule we have recently laid down in People v. Connor, and other cases, covers this assignment. We there held that the proceedings of the Court of Sessions were to be construed like those of the District Court, and that the same presumptions attach to them as to those of the District Court. If, from resignation or other such cause, one of the Justices after a trial should not be able to sit on the motion for a new trial, unquestionably this would not prevent the matter from being passed upon by another J ustiee acting in the place of the one thus incapacitated. We must presume that a sufficient reason existed to justify this change in the Bench—in other words, that the Court acted properly in the premises, when nothing is shown to the contrary. These remarks are made upon the assumption that the point, in the absence of these matters of explanation, is well taken. But upon a reconsideration of the subject we are not disposed so to hold. We think that the ends of justice might generally be better subserved if all the members of the Court who heard the case on the trial should sit on the motion for a new trial; but this
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