People v. Lee

Whebe the verdict of the jury, after finding the prisoner guility of murder in the first degree, contained a recommendation to mercy; and the Court directed the verdict to be recorded without the recommendation: Held, not to be error; that the recommendation was addressed solely to the Court, and was no part of the verdict.

On motion for new trial, after conviction of murder, defendant offered to prove that one or more of the jurors agreed to the verdict upon the mistaken impression that it was in the power of the Court to sentence to imprisonment or death in its ‘discretion; and that the verdict wonld have been different but for this impression : Held, that the Court below properly rejected such proof; that the jury have nothing to do with the character or extent of the punishment—their province being solely to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The fact that during a trial for murder some of the jurors lifted up a witness, who had suddenlyfainted during her examination, and carried her into an adjoining chamber of the Judge, and laid her upon a sofa—the Deputy Sheriff in attendance upon the Court accompanying the jurors, who were absent about a minute, during which time the witness was insensible—is no ground for a new trial because of a separation of the jurors.

Where on trial for murder it was proven that the wound of the deceased was mortal; that she was fully aware of her condition; stated that she could not live; and requested her mother to sfcnd for a priest; Held, to be sufficient foundation for the introduction of dying declarations.

Defendant having plead not guilty to an indictment for murder found by the grand jury of San Francisco, asked leave to withdraw his plea for the purpose of moving to set aside the indictment, on the ground that one Shepheard was present in the grand jury room while the charge in the indictment was under consideration. Leave refused, because the Court below knew Shepheard to have been Assistant District Attorney at the time : Held, that granting leave rested in the discretion of the Court below; and no circumstances being shown indicating any abuse of that discretion, the action of the Court must stand.

Held, further, that inasmuch as the leave rested in the discretion of the Court, it was immaterial whether the record does or does not disclose the reason of the Court's action—that is, its knowledge that Shepheard was Assistant District Attorney.

Where, on indictment for murder, the Court directed the Clerk to call and impannel the jury; and defendant objected that several of the jurors of the original panel had been excused without his consent; and that there was not a full panel present: Held, that the Court properly overruled the objection.