Schuhman v. Garratt
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
The acceptance of a deed does not, in favor of a stranger—that is, one neither party nor privy to the deed—estop the grantee in fee from showing that the grantor had no title at the date of the deed.
Estoppels are mutual, and bind both parties or neither; and, as a person neither party nor privy to a deed is not bound to acknowledge a title under it, so the grantee in the deed is not bound by it in favor of such person.
Whether this principle would be affected by the fact that the grantee in such case obtained actual possession under his deed, not determined.
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Cope, J. and Field, C. J. concurring.
[102]Ejectment for a lot in San Francisco.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial, and setting aside a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff below.
The plaintiff deraigned title through an attachment in favor of one Hillman against George C. Potter, which was levied on this lot' on the seventeenth of November, 1854; judgment obtained in the attachment suit, and deed made in October, 1857. Respondents set up a mortgage, dated November 22nd, 1853, by one Hutton to W. T. Sherman to the premises. This mortgage was foreclosed, and a deed made under the decree to H. S. Turner, July 1st, 1858. Respondents took a lease from Sherman on the eleventh of November, 1856. Sherman, on the twenty-third of April, 1857, conveyed premises to Turner; respondents before this suit, by direction of Sherman, attorned to Turner. Plaintiff. showed a deed from George C. Potter to Sherman, dated June 18th, 1855, contending that respondents, as lessees of Sherman, were estopped from denying the title of George C. Potter. The deed from Potter to ' Sherman conveyed “ the interest derived by said Potter by the foreclosure and sale of a certain mortgage from G. M. Hutton, dated April 10th, 1854.”
We assume that the title was in Hutton when the mortgage to Sherman was made. The effect of the decree and sale was to vest the title in the purchaser (and the title would thus relate to the date of the mortgage) if the necessary parties were made. But it is said "that to this decree Potter was not a party, and therefore he was not bound by it. It is not shown expressly that Potter was the assignee of Hutton at the time of this suit of Sherman or of the decree, or the successor, in interest, in any way, of Hutton; except that it is insisted that Sherman took the deed before described from Potter, and that thereby Sherman acknowledged Potter’s interest in the premises, and hence, that these lessees, claiming through Sherman, cannot dispute Potter’s title; therefore, as the plaintiff has an older title from Potter than that of Potter to Sherman, he is entitled to recover from these lessees of Sherman, though the latter acknowledge and hold under the title of Turner deraigned from Sherman. But the plaintiff claiming through this Sheriff’s deed to Potter (which was made after the sale of the premises, bound by the levy of the attachment) takes only such title as Potter had in the property at the time of the levy of Hillman and the subsequent sale. There is no evidence here that Potter .had any title, except from the fact that Sherman took a deed from him of his interest derived from this sale
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