McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.
Before: Cope
Synopsis
Plaiktiits file their bill in equity to enjoin defendants from diverting a certain quantity of the water of Bear river, alleging that their right to one thousand inches of the water of that stream, as against defendants, was adjudicated in a former action. In that action, which was trespass for the diversion of the water, it was alleged that this quantity of the water of the stream had been appropriated by the plaintiffs for mill purposes; that such quantity was necessary for their use, and that defendants had diverted the same, to their damage, etc. Plaintiffs had verdict and judgment for $21,800 damages. Held, that the averments are insufficient to entitle plaintiffs to an injunction; the scope of the bill being simply to enforce in equity plaintiff’s alleged right to one thousand inches of water, on the sole ground, that it was adjudged as their right in the former suit.
Held, further, that plaintiffs should be permitted, if they desire, to so amend their complaint as to present for determination their legal rights, otherwise the complaint should be dismissed.
A general verdict does not operate as an estoppel, except as to such matters as were necessarily considered and determined by the jury. A verdict is never conclusive upon immaterial or collateral issues.
In an action to recover damages for the diversion of the water of a stream from plaintiffs’ mills, an averment as to the precise quantity of water required for the use of the mills, and to which plaintiffs claimed to be entitled, is an immaterial averment; and a recovery of damages would not establish plaintiffs’ right to the exact quantity of water claimed, so as to be res judicata in a subsequent suit.
In such action for damages, no issue could be taken upon the averment as to the particular quantity of water diverted.
Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Baldwin, J. and Field, C. J. concurring.
This is a suit in equity to enjoin the defendants from diverting a certain quantity of the water of Bear river. The plaintiffs allege that their right to one thousand inches of the water as against the defendants, was adjudicated in a former action. The record in such action is made a part of the complaint. It was alleged in that case that this quantity of the water of the stream had been appropriated by the plaintiffs for mill purposes, that such quantity was necessary for their use, and that the defendants had diverted the same to their damage, etc. The plaintiffs obtained a verdict and judgment for twenty-one thousand eight hundred dollars in damages. It is contended that by this verdict [148]and judgment the quantity of water to which the plaintiffs are entitled was conclusively determined, and that the defendants are estopped from putting the same matter again in issue in another suit. The allegations of the complaint look to equitable relief only, and are not sufficient to authorize a determination of the legal rights of the parties. If these rights were not determined in the original controversy, the case necessarily falls to the ground.
The principle by which the decision of this case must be governed, has already been passed upon by this Court in Kidd v. Laird, decided-at the present term. We there held that a general verdict did not operate as an estoppel, except as to such matters as were necessarily considered and determined by the jury. Our further examination of the question in this case has not changed our opinion, but furnished us many additional reasons in favor of its correctness. “ In order to constitute an estoppel,” said Chief Justice Shaw, in Eastman v. Cooper, (15 Pick. 276) “ the same point must be put in issue, upon the record, and directly found by the jury. Wherever a point of fact has been so put in issue, and found by a jury, then the record is regarded as conclusive of that fact, whenever it is again drawn in question by the parties, or their privies.” In Gilbert v. Thompson (9 Cush. 348) the law is declared to' be well settled, “ that a judgment in a former action is conclusive only when the same cause of action has been once adjudicated between the same parties, or the same point has been put in issue upon the record, and directly found by the verdict of the jury.” It was held in Porter v. Baker (19 N. H. 166) that “ a fact found by a verdict and judgment, to constitute an estoppel, must be res judicata; that which was necessarily and immediately found according to the pleadings, not that on which the verdict was merely based—a fact in issue, as distinct from a fact in controversy.” It is too well settled to be controverted, that a verdict is never conclusive upon immaterial or collateral issues. (1 Story, 474; 18 Wend. 107; 7 Pick. 146.)
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